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Intrusion detection is the practice of examining information from computers and 
networks to identify cyberattacks. It is an important topic in practice, since the frequency 
and consequences of cyberattacks continues to increase and affect organizations. It is 
important for research, since many problems exist for intrusion detection systems. 
Intrusion detection systems monitor large volumes of data and frequently generate false 
positives. This results in additional effort for security analysts to review and interpret 
alerts. After long hours spent reviewing alerts, security analysts become fatigued and 
make bad decisions. There is currently no approach to intrusion detection that reduces the 
workload of human analysts by providing a probabilistic prediction that a computer is 
experiencing a cyberattack.  
This research addressed this problem by estimating the probability that a computer 
system was being attacked, rather than alerting on individual events. This research 
combined concepts from cyber situation awareness by applying clustering ensembles, 
probability analysis, and active learning. The unique contribution of this research is that it 
provides a higher level of meaning for intrusion alerts than traditional approaches.  
Three experiments were conducted in the course of this research to demonstrate the 
feasibility of these concepts. The first experiment evaluated cluster generation 
approaches that provided multiple perspectives of network events using unsupervised 
machine learning. The second experiment developed and evaluated a method for 
detecting anomalies from the clustering results. This experiment also determined the 
probability that a computer system was being attacked. Finally, the third experiment 
integrated active learning into the anomaly detection results and evaluated its 
effectiveness in improving the accuracy. 
This research demonstrated that clustering ensembles with probabilistic analysis were 
effective for identifying normal events. Abnormal events remained uncertain and were 
assigned a belief. By aggregating the belief to find the probability that a computer system 
was under attack, the resulting probability was highly accurate for the source IP addresses 
and reasonably accurate for the destination IP addresses. Active learning, which 
simulated feedback from a human analyst, eliminated the residual error for the 
destination IP addresses with a low number of events that required labeling.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Background 
Intrusion detection systems identify cyberattacks. Malicious or criminal 
cyberattacks take an average of 229 days to detect, and the length of time to detect and 
contain an attack increases the cost of response (Ponemon Institute, 2016). Consequently, 
detecting cyberattacks quickly is vital for organizations. Because of the volume of 
intrusion alerts, cyberattacks are sometimes miscategorized in the large number of alerts 
that require human analyst review (Julisch, 2003). After long hours of review, analysts 
make mistakes, and alerts may be miscategorized (Sawyer et al., 2014). Further, human 
analysts make inaccurate decisions and use preconceived biases when dealing with 
probabilistic reasoning (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Most intrusion detection research 
has focused on identifying individual events and has not provided meaning in the broader 
perspective of cyber situation awareness (CSA) (Sommer & Paxson, 2003; Erbacher, 
Frincke, Wong, Moody, & Fink, 2010; Sommer & Paxson, 2010; Tadda & Salerno, 
2010). Detecting intrusions at the individual event level is prone to high false positive 
rates and overfitting (Sommer & Paxson, 2010). Thus, new approaches to intrusion 
detection are needed to provide better support for human decision-making under 
uncertain conditions. 
This research developed a system for anomaly-based intrusion detection. The 
system incorporated multiple views of anomalies to find the probability that a computer 
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system was under attack or had been compromised.  The novelty of this research was the 
application of clustering ensembles, probability analysis, and active learning to extend 
research in intrusion detection. This research also incorporated relevant concepts from 
CSA to add meaning to intrusion alerts. 
  
Problem Statement 
There is currently no approach to intrusion detection that reduces the workload of 
human analysts by providing a probabilistic prediction that a computer is experiencing a 
cyberattack. Intrusion detection systems monitor increasingly large datasets that represent 
interconnected devices and sensors (Saeed, Ahmadinia, Javed, & Larijani, 2016; Al-
Hamadi & Chen, 2015; Ali & Al-Shaer, 2015). The alerts generated by intrusion 
detection systems require human review to evaluate the accuracy of the alerts and to 
determine an appropriate course of action (Julisch, 2003). A significant problem is that 
intrusion alerts often have high false-positive rates, since intrusions are rare in large 
datasets (Kruegel, Mutz, Robertson, & Valeur, 2003; Scott, 2004). Thus, security analysts 
become fatigued and make poor decisions after spending hours reviewing alerts (Sawyer 
et al., 2014). Improvements in intrusion detection systems are needed to reduce false-
positives, improve the context of alerts, and reduce the burden on human analysts.  
 
Dissertation Goal 
The goal of this research was to improve anomaly-based intrusion detection by 
adding meaning to alerts through the use of probabilistic clustering ensembles. Adding 
meaning to alerts shifts the focus from the individual event level to the computer system 
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level. This research developed a method to reduce the workload of security analysts by 
focusing on the computer systems most likely experiencing attacks. The results of this 
research will allow security analysts to better prioritize their monitoring activity, which 
has been found to be important in practice (McElwee, Heaton, Fraley, & Cannady, 2017). 
 
Discussion 
An important objective of this research was to apply clustering ensembles to 
intrusion detection. There is not one correct way to cluster network information to 
identify anomalies. Instead, there are multiple perspectives that, when taken together, 
improve accuracy.  This idea is supported from prior research, which acknowledges that 
“clustering is in the eye of the beholder” (Estivill-Castro, 2002, p. 65). To illustrate this 
idea, consider that a reasonable person is given a deck of playing cards, with 52 cards of 
four suits, and two joker cards. The person is given direction to cluster the cards into 
meaningful groups. There are a wide variety of ways that the person might cluster the 
cards. The person might cluster the cards using an obvious feature, such as the face value, 
by grouping together all the aces in one group, the twos in another group, the threes in 
another group, and so on. Such a grouping results in 13 clusters of four cards each and a 
cluster with two jokers. The person might opt for four clusters, where each cluster is 
identified by the suit of the card, specifically diamonds, hearts, clubs, and spades. This 
grouping results in four clusters with 13 cards in each. In this case, the jokers do not 
cluster well, but may be considered anomalies. The person might group the cards using a 
feature derived from outside information, such as grouping the cards needed to assemble 
a deck for a special game. Such a group might consist of the nines, tens, jacks, queens, 
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kings, and aces for playing the game of pinochle. The second group is those not needed to 
play that game. Figure 1 illustrates this example using two sample clusterings. 
 
Figure 1. Multiple ways to cluster a deck of cards 
 
From the playing card example above, it is obvious that there is not one correct 
way to cluster the cards. Each clustering result has different meaning for different 
reasons. A wide variety of clustering results is possible based on the features chosen to 
create the groups. Even the anomalies, as represented in 𝑃2 by the jokers, are only 
anomalies because of the meaning the person placed on the clustering. Thus, in some 
clustering approaches, the jokers cluster well, but in others they appear to be anomalies. 
This research used clustering ensembles, which use many different clusterings of 
the data to create a clustering solution that works best (Strehl & Gosh, 2002; Fred & Jain, 
2005). Figure 2 illustrates the general approach to clustering ensembles. The first stage 
generates a diverse set of clustering solutions, ℙ, from among all possible clustering 
solutions, ℙ𝑋. The second stage evaluates the results to arrive at a final clustering 
solution, 𝑃∗. 
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Figure 2. Clustering ensemble overview 
 
This research used clustering ensembles because of their potential to be useful for 
intrusion detection, since they enable unsupervised machine learning using multiple 
sources of information, including domain knowledge, in the final clustering solution 
(Strehl & Ghosh, 2002).  Ensemble approaches to machine learning have proven to be 
successful in resisting adversarial evasion (Šrndić & Laskov, 2014; Wang, Wang, Zheng, 
& Zhao, 2014). Evasion is a tactic to conduct cyberattacks without being detected. There 
have been few applications of clustering ensembles to intrusion detection (Weng, Jiang, 
Shi, & Wu, 2007; Gao, Zhu, & Wang, 2010). Other related studies have shown that 
clustering ensembles have the potential to be effective when applied to intrusion 
detection. Lazarevic and Kumar (2005) used an approach similar to clustering ensembles, 
called feature bagging, and found it to be successful for intrusion detection. Hou, Chen, 
Tas, Demihovskiy, and Ye (2015) found that clustering ensembles were better for the 
detection of malware than single base clustering algorithms. 
The importance of adding meaning to alerts is established in prior research. 
Sommer and Paxson (2003) found that adding context to intrusion detection improved 
signature-based methods by detecting multi-step attacks. Machine learning algorithms for 
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intrusion detection can find what is abnormal, but generate false positives, because they 
lack meaning (Sommer & Paxson, 2010). As a result, security analysts must evaluate 
binary indications of cyberattacks with insufficient meaning to make appropriate 
decisions. Thus, this research created a semantic level that better represents how human 
analysts evaluate security alerts.  
Computer network intrusions are generally a multi-step process that requires an 
attacker and a victim. (Zhou, Leckie, & Karunasekera, 2010). Understanding the meaning 
and significance of network events requires an understanding of the coordination of 
events (Zhou et al., 2010). The connection of these events is often uncertain and requires 
probabilistic reasoning. Thus, this research used probability analysis to evaluate if a 
computer system was being attacked.  
 
Relevance and Significance 
Intrusion detection is an important topic in research as well as in practice, and 
identifying cyberattacks quickly is important for reducing response costs (Ponemon 
Institute, 2016). Unfortunately, intrusion alerts are sometimes missed because of the 
volume that must be reviewed (Julisch, 2003). After long hours of reviewing security 
alerts, human analysts make poor decisions, and alerts may be miscategorized (Sawyer et 
al., 2014). Humans tend to make inaccurate decisions and use preconceived biases when 
dealing with probabilistic reasoning (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In addition, 
adversarial tactics and evasion require new approaches for the identification of malicious 
activity (Šrndić & Laskov, 2014; Wang et al., 2014). As a result, improving intrusion 
detection is a relevant topic for continued research to provide better support for decision-
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making under uncertain conditions. Given the importance of intrusion detection and the 
limitations of human judgement, this research provides context for analysts, so they can 
make better decisions. The results of this research may be used to augment security 
analyst capabilities for responding to intrusion alerts. 
 
Barriers and Issues 
This research addressed several barriers and issues that are present in anomaly-
based intrusion detection research. First, anomaly-based intrusion detection is prone to 
high false-positive rates. This is largely due to the imbalanced nature of intrusion 
detection data, since there are large amounts of data, but only a few intrusion events 
(Scott, 2004). The base rate fallacy stipulates that when events of interest are rare, even 
highly accurate detection systems may have a high false positive rate (Kruegel et al., 
2003). This research addressed this issue by focusing on the probability that a computer 
system was being attacked rather than on determining the accurate classification of 
individual events (Li, Ou, & Rajagopalan, 2010; Tadda & Salerno, 2010). 
A second issue in intrusion detection research is overfitting. To achieve higher 
accuracy, researchers may over-train learning algorithms or use too much training data to 
be generalizable for novel anomalies. This is because machine learning algorithms are 
more suitable for detecting similarities than for detecting anomalies (Sommer & Paxson, 
2010). Overfitting may also result from the selection of a dataset that contains too many 
duplicate records, such as the popular KDD Cup 1999 dataset (Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu, & 
Ghorbani, 2009). Since ensemble approaches to machine learning are less susceptible to 
overfitting, this research applied clustering ensembles that were generated using bagging. 
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A third issue in intrusion detection is adversarial evasion. To avoid detection, 
attackers may attack the intrusion detection system itself. Attacks against intrusion 
detection systems include evasion, tampering, and denial of service (Laskov & 
Lippmann, 2010; Šrndić & Laskov, 2014; Wang et al., 2014; Vasilomanolakis, 
Karuppayah, Mühlhäuser, & Fischer, 2015). Evasion amplifies the problem of overfitting 
by preventing the detection of novel attacks (Sommer & Paxson, 2010). To address this 
problem, this research used ensemble approaches, since they have been found effective in 
resisting adversarial evasion (Šrndić & Laskov, 2014; Wang et al., 2014). In addition, this 
research applied active learning, which has been shown to allow adaptation to evasive 
techniques (Miller et al., 2014).  
A fourth issue in intrusion detection research is the use of a suitable dataset for 
evaluation. Most early intrusion detection research used the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, 
which was prepared from a DARPA packet capture for a KDD competition (Cao, Hoang, 
Nguyen, 2013). The KDD Cup 1999 dataset has been criticized because of its duplicate 
records, its outdated information because of older technologies, and its high volume of 
records (Qian, Xu, & Shi, 2006; Tavallaee et al., 2009; Creech & Hu, 2013). To address 
this problem, a variety of researchers have created new intrusion detection evaluation 
datasets. None of the newer datasets has received as much widespread popularity and 
adoption as KDD Cup 1999. This research included a literature review of publicly 
available intrusion detection datasets. As a result, the NSL-KDD dataset was used for 
preliminary evaluation and the UNSW-NB15 dataset for evaluation with a more 
contemporary dataset (Tavallaee et al., 2009; Moustafa & Slay, 2015).   
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Definition of Terms 
Accuracy: The ratio of the number of true positive and true negative results compared to 
the number of all results. 
Active Learning: A semi-supervised machine learning approach in which a subset of 
unknown data is selected and presented to an oracle for labeling during training. 
Alert: A notification or warning, which in the context of intrusion detection, represents a 
potential cyberattack. 
Anomaly: An event that deviates from a normal event.  
Attack: An aggressive action against a computer system that may include unauthorized 
modification of files to allow unauthorized access to system information, 
unauthorized access or modification of user information, unauthorized 
modification of information in network components, or unauthorized use of 
system resources, including unauthorized account creation (Chebrolu, Abraham, 
& Thomas, 2005). 
Bagging: A machine learning method that provides a random subset of features and 
records to a machine learning algorithm with a goal of reducing overfitting. 
Bayes Theorem: Methods of probabilistic inference that calculate a prior probability of a 
hypothesis based on evidence gathered from observations (Kruegel et al., 2003). 
Bayesian Networks: Directed acyclic graphs, where each node in the graph represents a 
conditional probability table (Kruegel et al., 2003). 
Clustering: Finding natural groupings in data such that data within each cluster is most 
similar to other data in that cluster and most dissimilar to the data of other clusters 
(Zhou & Tang, 2006; Jain, 2010). 
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Clustering Ensemble: An approach to clustering that uses combinations of multiple 
partitions of clustering results to find a consensus partition that improves accuracy 
compared to an individual clustering result (Topchy, Jain, & Punch, 2005; Ayad 
& Kamel, 2010).  
Cyber Situation Awareness: A specialized application of situation awareness that 
applies to the analysis of cyberattacks and their impact on computer and network 
operations (Li et al., 2010; Erbacher et al., 2010). 
Cyberattack: See Attack. 
Ensemble: A multi-learner system, where each component learner attempts to solve the 
same task as the others (Strehl & Ghosh, 2002). 
Evasion: Deceiving an intrusion detection system or rending it ineffective through the 
modification of training or testing data (Šrndić & Laskov, 2014; Wang et al., 
2014; Laskov & Lippman, 2010). 
False Positive: In the context of intrusion detection, a condition in which a predicted 
class indicates an attack, but the actual class was normal. 
Intrusion Detection: The practice of examining information from computers and 
networks that are to be protected in order to identify attacks against those 
computers and networks (Debar, Dacier, & Wespi, 1999). 
KDD Cup 1999: A dataset that has been widely used in intrusion detection research. 
Machine Learning: A field of computer science that uses algorithms to learn patterns 
without being programmed with predefined rules. 
Mirkin Distance: An algorithm for comparing two clusters by counting the number of 
point pairs that are exclusive to each of the two clusters (Meilă, 2007). 
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Oracle: An entity that represents a knowledgeable human subject matter expert and is 
able to provide the correct label for a data record in response to a query.  
Overfitting: A modeling error in which a machine learning algorithm is trained to match 
a particular set of data but is not generalizable to other sets of data. 
Partition: A set of clusters that represent the results from a single clustering algorithm. 
Security Analyst: A job function that specializes in cyber defensive operations in the 
context of a business or organization. 
Security Monitoring: A job function of security analysts for detecting and responding to 
potential cyberattacks. 
Signature: A predefined pattern that matches characteristics of attacks. 
Situation Awareness: The perception of information in an environment for a given time 
and space, the comprehension of the meaning of that information, and the 
projection of the future conditions in order to enable effective selection of an 
appropriate course of action (Endsley, 1995; Tadda & Salerno, 2010). 
Supervised Machine Learning: An approach to machine learning in which records with 
known classes are used to train an algorithm so that it can then predict an output 
for records with unknown classes. 
Unsupervised Machine Learning: An approach to machine learning in which no 
expected outcome is provided for training an algorithm. 
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List of Acronyms 
ANMI: Average Normalized Mutual Information 
CSA: Cyber Situation Awareness 
CSPA: Cluster-Based Similarity Partitioning Algorithm 
CSV: Comma Separated Value 
CTBN: Continuous Time Bayesian Networks 
CVSS: Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DOS: Denial of Service 
EM: Expectation Maximization 
FN: False Negative 
FP: False Positive 
GPU: Graphics Processing Unit 
HGPA: Hypergraph Partitioning Algorithm 
IDS: Intrusion Detection System 
KDD: Knowledge Discovery in Databases 
LAC: Locally Adaptive Clustering  
LAN: Local Area Network 
MCLA: Meta Clustering Algorithm 
NM: Normalized Mutual Information 
NMF: Nonnegative Matrix Factorization  
QMI: Quadratic Mutual Information 
ROC: Receiver Operating Characteristics 
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SCANN: Stacking, Correspondence Analysis and Nearest Neighbor 
SVM: Support Vector Machine 
TN: True Negative 
TP: True Positive 
WBPA: Weighty Bipartite Partition Algorithm 
WSBPA: Weighted Subspace Bipartite Partitioning Algorithm 
WSPA: Weighty Similarity Partition Algorithm 
 
Summary 
This chapter introduced an approach to anomaly-based intrusion detection using 
clustering ensembles. This chapter described how this research approached the problems 
of too much data and high false positives rates. Finally, this chapter established the goal 
of shifting the focus of intrusion detection from individual events to higher level of 
meaning. This research explored how to predict the probability that a computer system 
was under attack to enable security analysts to make better decisions under uncertain 
conditions. 
The remainder of this dissertation report provides the supporting background for 
this research and describes the methodology that was used. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature that established the basis for this research. Chapter 3 describes the experiments 
conducted to test the effectiveness of clustering ensembles with probabilistic analysis for 
intrusion detection as well as the testing approaches for evaluating the results. Chapter 4 
presents the results of the experiments. Finally, Chapter 5 explores the conclusions of this 
14 
research, the implications for future research, and recommendations for building upon the 
foundation laid by this research. 
  
15 
Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
Overview of Reviewed Topics 
The focus of this research was to develop an intrusion detection system that 
provides meaning for intrusion alerts by using clustering ensembles and probabilistic 
analysis. To accomplish this research, the following areas of literature were examined to 
synthesize these concepts: 
• Cyber Situation Awareness (CSA) 
• Intrusion Detection 
• Probabilistic Intrusion Detection 
• Clustering Ensembles 
• Intrusion Detection Datasets 
Each of these areas has an established body of existing research. The following 
sections describe the importance of each of these areas, review relevant research studies 
in each topic, and synthesize the key concepts needed for building a foundation for this 
research. 
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Cyber Situation Awareness (CSA) 
Background 
Situation awareness is the perception of information in an environment for a given 
time and space. It comprehends the meaning of information and projects the future 
conditions to enable the effective selection of a course of action (Endsley, 1995; Tadda & 
Salerno, 2010). Situation awareness is an essential function in various fields that require 
the interpretation of information about the environment for effective decision-making 
(Endsley, 1995). The goals of situation awareness are to identify what is happening, why 
it is happening, what will happen next, and what can be done about it (Erbacher et al., 
2010). Seminal work in situation awareness was conducted by Endsley (1995) and 
resulted in a theoretical model for use in discussion and future research. Endsley (1995) 
developed a three-level model of situation awareness. At the first level, situation 
awareness deals with perceiving the elements of the current situation. After the elements 
are collected, the second level entails comprehension of the current situation. This second 
level includes correlation and integration of data to achieve a higher level of 
understanding (Erbacher et al., 2010). Finally, the third level focuses on projecting a 
future state and the potential impact on future operations (Erbacher et al., 2010). 
Decision-making regarding a course of action occurs after all three levels are developed 
to some extent by analysts. 
CSA is a specialized application of situation awareness that applies to a first-level 
analysis of cyberattacks and their impact on computer and network operations (Li et al., 
2010; Erbacher et al., 2010). Improving CSA increases the effectiveness of security 
analysts in dealing with attacks (Brynielsson, Frank, & Varga, 2016). CSA involves the 
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interpretation of raw security events to identify malicious actors, legitimate users, and 
system abnormalities in the context of system operating conditions and known 
vulnerabilities (Erbacher et al., 2010).  
 
Review of CSA Literature 
Ensdley (1995) introduced the theory of situation awareness to address the 
problem that there was no underlying theory that supported moving from discrete 
observations to a comprehension of the overall situation. As a result, Endsley (1995) 
defined a model for situation awareness to support future discussion and research. The 
model contains three levels of situation awareness that are driven by goals, objectives, 
and preconceived ideas: Level 1 deals with perceiving the elements of the current 
situation; Level 2 entails comprehension of the current situation; and Level 3 focuses on 
projecting a future state. 
Ehrbacher et al. (2010) built upon Endsley’s (1995) research by applying the 
model to CSA. Using cognitive task analysis, Ehrbacher et al. (2010) addressed the need 
for improved decision making for security analysts. The results of this study found that 
CSA includes impact identification, damage assessment, recovery, projection to the 
future, as well as characterization of attacks and attackers (Erbacher et al., 2020). To 
uncover the collaborative processes for threat analysts, Ahrend, Jirotka, and Jones (2016) 
conducted interviews with threat analysts on their day-to-day practices. This study found 
that too much data leads to decisions made with uncertainty and that information is 
critical for reducing uncertainty at all stages of CSA (Ahrend et al., 2016). In addition, 
Ahrend et al. (2016) found that analysts rely upon what they remember from their own 
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past investigations. As a result, biases from past incidents may incorrectly inform future 
decisions when evaluating alerts. 
Gutzwiller, Hunt, and Lange (2016) used cognitive task analysis for studying 
CSA but focused on determining the goals and information elements needed to make 
decisions. The results demonstrated that CSA requires abstraction at several levels: 1) the 
network as well as its architecture and state; 2) the world, including emergent threats, 
abnormal behaviors, and attack signatures; and 3) the team, with a focus on how teams 
work and how they hand-off work to each other (Gutzwiller et al., 2016). Similarly, 
Newcomb, Hammell, and Hutchinson (2016) found that high levels of abstraction were 
necessary to enable decision making in their experimental study that addressed the 
problem of too many intrusion alerts for analysts to evaluate. Bartnes, Moe, and 
Heegaard (2016) studied CSA with a goal of improving security incident response. Their 
study used semi-structured interviews and found that, since there is an absence of major 
events during normal operating conditions as well as a low priority for training, security 
analysts are not prepared for incidents when they occur (Bartnes et al., 2016). 
Rajivan and Cooke (2017) explored team-level CSA, including human 
collaboration and information sharing. Using constructs of shared mental models, 
transactive memory, and interactive team cognition, this study used a combination of 
cognitive task analysis and event analysis of systemic teamwork (EAST) to empirically 
test the results (Rajivan & Cooke, 2017). This study found that the role of teamwork is 
important for CSA at every level of cybersecurity defense (Rajivan & Cooke, 2017). 
Zhong et al. (2017) captured the cognitive processes of security analysts involved in 
triaging security alerts. This study created a framework for retrieving data that is relevant 
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to the triage process to provide context for alerts (Zhong et al., 2017). In addition, this 
study created a system with a user interface that automatically identified the information 
that analysts required for decision-making (Zhong et al., 2017). 
Table 1 summarizes literature from empirical CSA studies. Results from these 
studies are important in characterizing the meaning of intrusion alerts in the context of 
CSA. 
 
Table 1 
Summary of CSA Literature 
Study Problem Methodology Findings or Contributions 
Erbacher et 
al. (2010) 
Need for 
improved 
decision making 
for security 
analysts 
Cognitive task 
analysis 
CSA goals include impact 
identification, damage assessment, 
recovery, projection to the future, 
and characterization of attacks and 
attackers.  
Ahrend et al. 
(2016) 
Uncover 
collaborative 
processes for 
threat analysts 
Interviews 
with threat 
analysts on 
day-to-day 
practices 
Too much data leads to making 
decisions under uncertainty. 
Information is critical to reducing 
uncertainty at all stages. Analysts 
rely upon what they remember from 
their own past investigations. 
Gutzwiller et 
al. (2016) 
Determine the 
goals and 
information 
elements needed 
for CSA 
Cognitive task 
analysis 
Abstraction for CSA includes: 1) the 
network and its architecture and 
state; 2) the world, including 
emergent threats, abnormal 
behaviors, and attack signatures; 3) 
and the team, with a focus on how 
the team works and hands-off work 
to each other. 
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Table 1  
Summary of CSA Literature (cont.) 
Study Problem Methodology Findings or Contributions 
Newcomb et 
al. (2016) 
Too many 
intrusion alerts 
for security 
analysts to 
evaluate 
Experimental 
study 
CSA requires a high level of 
abstraction to enable decision-
making. CVSS scores are not a good 
indicator of vulnerabilities for CSA. 
Bartnes, 
Moe, & 
Heegaard 
(2016) 
How to improve 
security incident 
response 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
Absence of major events prevents 
preparation for security incidents, 
and training for security incidents is 
not a priority in organizations.  
Rajivan & 
Cooke 
(2017) 
Understanding 
the role of 
teamwork in 
CSA 
Cognitive task 
analysis and 
event analysis 
of systemic 
teamwork 
Teamwork is important for 
improving CSA at every level of 
cybersecurity defense processes. 
Limitations in teamwork have a 
detrimental impact on defense. 
 
Discussion 
CSA must consider the network topology (Brynielsson et al., 2016), 
vulnerabilities (Erbacher et al., 2010), cyber personas (Brynielsson et al., 2016), and the 
current threat landscape (Gutzwiller et al., 2016). In addition, CSA must include a time 
component that considers near real-time events, mid-term events, and long-term events 
(Brynielsson et al., 2016). Taking all of this information and the various time views into 
account, CSA requires a high level of abstraction that enables human decision-making 
(Ergacher et al., 2010; Gutzwiller et al., 2016; Newcomb et al., 2016). 
In addition to technical security monitoring systems, CSA relies upon a variety of 
techniques for understanding current and projected conditions. These techniques include: 
timelines of attacks (Erbacher et al., 2010), attack trees (Li et al., 2010), kill chains 
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(Bhatt, Yano, Amorim, & Gustavsson, 2014), Bayesian networks (Franke & Brynielsson, 
2014), and the diamond model (Al-Mohannadi et al., 2016). CSA requires both statistical 
techniques for understanding events and human knowledge to learn about novel attacks 
(Tadda & Salerno, 2010). 
CSA is a challenging practice for a variety of reasons. Most current work in 
cybersecurity monitoring focuses on single, isolated attacks and does not develop a full 
comprehension of the current situation or the projected state (Tadda & Salerno, 2010). 
The volume of computer and network data and alerts makes it impossible for security 
analysts to know the detailed operation of each computer in a network (Li et al., 2010). 
CSA relies upon uncertain, imperfect information (Li et al., 2010). As new information 
becomes available, security analysts must update their existing beliefs to address the 
uncertainty (Tadda & Salerno, 2010). In addition, CSA is challenging because, under 
normal conditions, there is an absence of major security incidents. As a result, security 
analysts often lack preparation, training, and documentation to support CSA when 
cyberattacks occur (Bartnes et al., 2016). 
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Intrusion Detection 
Background 
Intrusion detection is the practice of examining information from computers and 
networks to identify attacks (Debar et al., 1999). Intrusion detection identifies anomalies 
that represent computer network intrusions or uses signature-based approaches that detect 
patterns that match known intrusion techniques (Mukherjee, Heberlein, & Levitt, 1994). 
An important factor in detecting intrusions is deciding the source of data that will be 
monitored. Intrusion detection systems generally perform either network-based or host-
based intrusion detection (Mukherjee et al., 1994). A variety of attacks may be found by 
intrusion detection systems, including: 1) unauthorized modification of files to allow 
unauthorized access to system information; 2) unauthorized access or modification of 
user information; 3) unauthorized modification of information in network components; 
and 4) unauthorized use of system resources, including unauthorized account creation 
(Chebrolu et al., 2005). 
Intrusion detection systems are divided into signature-based detection and 
anomaly detection. Signature-based systems rely upon predefined patterns that match the 
characteristics of attacks.  Anomaly detection learns normal patterns and detects patterns 
that have not been encountered or predefined. Both signature-based detection and 
anomaly detection have advantages and disadvantages (Chebrolu et al., 2005). Intrusion 
detection is also categorized by the means in which data is collected as either network-
based or host-based. Xiao, Chen, and Chang (2014) provide a more comprehensive 
listing of types of intrusion detection systems, including: 1) network-based, 2) host-
based, 3) stack-based, 4) protocol-based, and 5) graph based. 
23 
Table 2 
Summary of Machine Learning Approaches to Intrusion Detection 
School of 
Thought 
Algorithms Research Studies 
Symbolist Decision trees, 
random forests 
Sinclair, Pierce, & Matzner (1999); Zhang, 
Zulkernine, & Haque (2008); Sindhu, Geetha, & 
Kannan (2012); McElwee (2017) 
Connectionist Neural networks, 
self-organizing 
maps, deep 
neural networks 
Cannady (1998); Rhodes, Mahaffey, & Cannady 
(2000); Stopel, Boger, Moskovitch, Shahar, & 
Elovici (2006); Ahmad, Abdullah, & Alghamdi 
(2009); Daliran, Nassiri, & Latif-Shabgahi (2010); 
Sindhu et al. (2012); McElwee & Cannady (2016); 
McElwee et al. (2017) 
Evolutionary Immune system, 
evolutionary 
neural networks, 
genetic 
programming 
Dasgupta & González (2002); Han & Cho (2005); 
Song, Heywood, & Zincir-Heywood (2005); Toosi 
& Kahani (2007); Sindhu et al. (2012) 
Bayesian Bayesian 
networks, naïve 
Bayes 
Valdes & Skinner (2000); Kruegel et al. (2003); 
Feng, Guan, Guo, Gao, & Liu (2004); Gowadia, 
Farkas, & Valtorta (2005); Tylman (2008); 
Perdisci, Ariu, Fogla, Giacinto, & Lee (2009); Xu 
& Shelton (2010); Koc, Mazzuchi, & Sarkani 
(2012); Yassin, Udzir, Muda, & Sulaiman (2013) 
Analogistic Support vector 
machine (SVM) 
Mukkamala, Janoski, & Sung (2002); Chen, Hsu, & 
Shen (2005); Tsang, Kwok, & Cheung (2005); 
Khan, Awad, & Thuraisingham (2007) 
 
 
Machine learning approaches can be divided into five primary schools of thought, 
as shown in Table 2: symbolist, connectionist, evolutionary, Bayesian, and analogistic 
(Domingos, 2015, p. 239). The symbolist approach uses inverse deduction with 
approaches like decision trees. The connectionist approach commonly applies neural 
networks and back propagation (Domingos, 2015, p. 239). Evolutionary machine learning 
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was inspired by Alan Turing (1950) and uses principles of biological evolution like 
random populations, mutation, and survival of the fittest. Bayesians, on the other hand, 
rely on probabilistic inference, as developed by Thomas Bayes and formalized by Pierre-
Simon Laplace (McGrayne, 2014, p. 159). Finally, the analogistic approach relies on the 
similarity between objects and uses tools like support vector machines (Domingos, 2015, 
p. 239).  
 
Review of Literature on Machine Learning for Intrusion Detection 
 Pioneering work in intrusion detection began with Denning and Neumann (1985) 
and was further developed by Denning (1987). This work sought to detect abnormal 
patterns of system behaviors that may represent security violations. This initial work 
resulted in an expert system that was expanded upon by Lunt (1990) and was 
subsequently developed into network-based intrusion detection (Heberlein et al., 1990). 
The remainder of this subsection reviews literature that applied machine learning to 
intrusion detection, excluding Bayesian approaches, which are covered in the next 
section. This literature review is presented in chronological order, but in most cases, the 
literature does not build upon previous research. Instead each applies different types and 
combinations of machine learning to the general problem of intrusion detection pioneered 
by Denning and Neumann (1985). 
Cannady (1998) conducted pioneering work in the application of machine 
learning to intrusion detection. This study applied neural networks to supervised misuse 
detection and achieved a detection accuracy of 97.5% for testing data. Sinclairet al. 
(1999) used both symbolist and evolutionary approaches by combining decision trees and 
genetic algorithms. This study found that, when combined, these two methods were 
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useful for defining network connection rules that could be used to create expert systems 
(Sinclair et al., 1999). Applying neural networks in a novel approach, Rhodes et al. 
(2000) applied Kohonen self-organizing maps to unsupervised intrusion detection. This 
study found that training self-organizing maps based on normal operating conditions 
allowed the unsupervised detection of buffer overflow attacks, which had not been 
present in the training data (Rhodes et al., 2000). Using evolutionary approaches, 
Dasgupta and González (2002) used an immune system model for intrusion detection and 
found that positive characterization was more precise than negative characterization but 
required more resources. 
Mukkamala et al. (2002) applied SVMs to intrusion detection and evaluated their 
effectiveness using the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Their study compared the results of 
SVMs to neural networks and found that the accuracy was comparable, but SVMs were 
limited by their binary output (Mukkamala et al., 2002).  
Julisch and Dacier (2002) and Julisch (2003) studied how to cluster intrusion 
detection system alerts for root cause analysis. These studies found that by iteratively 
identifying alerts that could be categorized as low criticality or false positives, clustering 
reduced the quantity of alerts that required review by human analysts (Julisch & Dacier, 
2002; Julisch, 2003).  
Chen et al. (2005) used SVMs and compared their accuracy to neural networks. 
Although Mukkamala et al. (2002) found comparable results between SVMs and neural 
networks, Chen et al. (2005) found that SVMs outperformed the neural networks in terms 
of detection accuracy. 
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Han and Cho (2005) applied evolutionary neural networks to intrusion detection 
using the IDEVAL dataset. This study found that using an evolutionary algorithm for 
defining the structure of the neural network reduced the required training time and 
improved detection accuracy (Han & Cho, 2005). Also using an evolutionary approach, 
Song et al. (2005) used genetic programing and applied it to the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
They found that hierarchical genetic programming was successful in detecting previously 
unseen attacks (Song et al., 2005). 
Using an analogistic approach, Tsang et al. (2005) used SVMs for intrusion 
detection. They introduced a new algorithm, called a Core Vector Machine, which 
reduced the computational complexity of the training process (Tsang et al., 2005). Stopel 
et al. (2006) compared neural networks, k-nearest neighbor, and decision trees to detect 
computer worms. They found that both neural networks and k-nearest neighbor had 
similar accuracy and that neural networks performed classification faster than k-nearest 
neighbor (Stopel et al., 2006). Neural networks are generally slower to train than other 
algorithms because of many iterations of back propagation, so their conclusion that 
neural networks were faster to train is surprising. 
Several researchers have combined multiple machine learning methods for 
detecting intrusions. As an example, Khan et al. (2007) combined hierarchical clustering 
with support vector machines and found that it improved the overall accuracy.  Similarly, 
Toosi and Kahani (2007) combined soft computing methods for classification with a 
genetic algorithm for fuzzy inference and found that this combination successfully 
detected normal events and denial of service attacks. Zhang et al. (2008) combined 
multiple approaches by applying random forests simultaneously to misuse and anomaly 
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detection. They found that the combination had a higher detection rate and a lower false 
positive rate than either independent approach (Zhang et al., 2008). 
Hu, Hu, Xie, and Maybank (2009) found that hierarchical graph-theoretic 
clustering was effective in active learning for intrusion detection. Ahmad et al. (2009) 
focused on detecting denial of service attacks using neural networks. They found that 
neural networks were capable of very high detection rates, except for teardown attacks 
(Ahmad et al., 2009).  Daliran et al. (2010) used neural networks for intrusion detection 
but used them for detection of malicious code in a honeypot environment. They found 
that neural networks achieved 80% accuracy when using labeled data from this 
environment (Daliran et al., 2010). 
Sindhu et al. (2012) combined three different schools of thought by applying 
genetic algorithms, neural networks, and decision trees simultaneously. This study used 
the genetic algorithm for feature selection, followed by a neural network for 
preprocessing the data (Sindhu et al., 2012). Finally, this study used a decision tree to 
classify the data and found that it had a higher detection rate than using either a neural 
network or a C4.5 classifier independently (Sindhu et al., 2012).  
Clustering is another machine learning approach that has been applied to intrusion 
detection. Dubey and Dubey (2015) used clustering to preprocess data for machine 
learning for intrusion detection. Li, Kao, Zhang, Chuang, and Yen (2015) also used 
clustering but applied it to network flow data, which was effective in detecting botnet 
activity. Silva and Hruschka (2016) found that SLS-IBkM clustering was effective for 
data streams, including the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Expanding upon the work of Rhodes 
et al. (2000) in using self-organizing maps for intrusion detection, McElwee and Cannady 
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(2016) focused on preprocessing intrusion detection data for imbalanced datasets. They 
found that filtering normal events and using Principal Component Analysis for feature 
reduction prior to training Kohonen self-organizing maps improved the detection 
accuracy and reduced the clustering time (McElwee & Cannady, 2016).  
McElwee (2017) applied active learning to random forest classification by 
beginning with unlabeled data and presenting a subset of the data to an oracle for 
labeling. This study found that by using k-means clustering to select a sample for the 
oracle, 90% the KDD Cup 1999 records could be classified accurately by manually 
labeling 0.13% of the total records (McElwee, 2017). Finally, expanding on the approach 
of Julisch (2003) in categorizing alerts, McElwee et al. (2017) applied deep neural 
networks to classifying alerts from a signature-based intrusion detection system and 
found that they were highly accurate for categorizing alerts. This approach was 
successful for assigning alerts to the appropriate security analysts as well as for 
automating routine reporting tasks (McElwee, Heaton, Fraley, & Cannady, 2017).  
 
Discussion 
Regardless of the approach used, intrusion detection systems can be evaluated 
using several different measures. Koc et al. (2012) highlight important evaluation criteria, 
including accuracy, error rate, and the area under receiver operating characteristics 
(ROC) curve. For binary classification, Figure 3 shows the possible outcomes of intrusion 
detection (Koc et al., 2012). 
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Figure 3. Confusion matrix for binary classification 
 
Using the criteria shown in Figure 3, it follows that accuracy can be defined as the 
number of true positives (TP) and true negatives (TN) divided by all possible outcomes: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 (1) 
Further, it follows that, given the accuracy, the error rate can be described as: 
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 1 − 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (2) 
Intrusion detection is an area of research that faces several on-going challenges. 
One of the most important research challenges is the reduction of false positives. Most 
false positives are generated because of under-specified signatures, intent guessing, and 
limited abstraction capability (Gowadia et al., 2005). To address the problem of false 
positives, some studies have focused on identifying the attackers rather than including all 
events across all computers and users (Burroughs, Wilson, & Cybenko, 2002). In 
addition, intrusions are rare and may be hidden in massive amounts of data (Scott, 2004). 
As a result, the prior probability of an attack is very low, so even a highly accurate 
intrusion detection system will have high false positive rates (Kruegel et al., 2003). 
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Another challenge in intrusion detection is the large amount of data and the 
repetitive work of analyzing and prioritizing the events. Sawyer et al. (2014) found that 
after prolonged monitoring activity, there was a noticeable drop in the accuracy of 
security analysts. Thus, for routine monitoring of intrusion detection alerts, solutions that 
require less human interaction are beneficial. The amount of data is voluminous and 
contains redundant features, which also makes detection difficult for intrusion detection 
systems because of imbalanced and irrelevant data (Chebrolu et al., 2005). 
Finally, intrusion detection systems may be considered high value targets for 
attackers. Intrusion detection systems are subject to adversarial evasion, including 
deceiving the intrusion detection system or rendering it ineffective (Šrndić & Laskov, 
2014; Wang et al., 2014). Laskov and Lippman (2010) found that adversaries may 
attempt to modify the training or testing data to alter the detection results. As a result, 
intrusion detection must utilize robust classifiers capable of dealing with attacks and 
uncertainty. 
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Probabilistic Intrusion Detection 
Background 
Probabilistic methods for intrusion detection apply statistical formulas and 
algorithms. Bayes theorem refers to methods of probabilistic inference that were initially 
developed by Thomas Bayes and later formalized by Pierre-Simon Laplace (McGrayne, 
2014, p. 159). The purpose of Bayes theorem and Bayesian networks is to allow the 
calculation of a prior probability of a hypothesis based on evidence gathered from 
observations (Kruegel et al., 2003). Bayesian updating is the process of estimating the 
probability of a hypothesis given that an event has been observed (Kruegel et al., 2003; 
Chivers, Clark, Nobles, Shaikh, & Chen, 2013).  Bayesian approaches also allow the 
combination of information from several sources (Scott, 2004; Chivers et al., 2013). 
Bayesian methods are preferable over frequency-based statistics for intrusion 
detection, since frequency-based methods are more prone to evasion (Swarnkar & 
Hubballi, 2016). In addition, Bayesian methods provide a simple way to include prior 
information (Scott, 2004) and allow knowledge representation that enables reasoning 
with uncertain information (Chebrolu et al., 2005). Probabilistic methods, like Bayes 
theorem, allow intrusions to be detected based on soft evidence, or beliefs, rather than 
hard evidence (Gowadia et al., 2005). This allows attacks to be presented as probabilities 
rather than as binary decisions (Gowadia et al., 2005). 
Probabilistic methods help to address the challenges of intrusion detection, in that 
there are massive amounts of data, but criminal intrusions are rare (Scott, 2004). This 
data imbalance contributes to the base rate fallacy, which shows that even a highly 
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accurate intrusion detection system will have a high false positive rate (Kruegel et al., 
2003). In formal terms: 
P(𝐵|𝐴) =  
P(𝐴|𝐵)P(𝐵)
P(𝐴)
 (3) 
Thus, if the prior probability of an actual intrusion event, P(B), is extremely low, 
it will force P(B|A) to be low, making detection more challenging.  Perdisci et al. (2009) 
found that a false positive rate for imbalanced data must therefore be 10-5 or lower. As a 
result, detecting intrusions for rare attacks is more challenging than for common attacks, 
since one of the goals of intrusion detection is to keep false alarms low (Pajouh, 
Dastghaibyfard, & Hashemi, 2017). 
One probabilistic approach is the use of Bayesian networks, which are directed 
acyclic graphs, where each node in the graph represents a conditional probability table 
(Kruegel et al., 2003). Another probabilistic approach is naïve Bayes, which is the 
simplest Bayesian classifier and performs well for datasets that have conditional 
independence of their features (Koc et al., 2012). A variation of naïve Bayes is hidden 
naïve Bayes, which creates an additional layer to represent a hidden parent for each node 
(Koc et al., 2012). 
Bayesian approaches show promise for intrusion detection, but there are many 
challenges as well. One problem with Bayesian networks is their node ordering 
requirement, which may require expert knowledge to develop (Chebrolu et al., 2005) or 
the use of an additional algorithm that can estimate the node ordering (Gowadia et al., 
2005). Another challenge with some Bayesian approaches is the computational 
complexity, especially for Type 2 algorithms, where the order is not given, which exhibit 
O(N4) complexity (Chebrolu et al., 2005). Bayesian networks are also known to have 
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suboptimal models that require large training datasets, which may not be available in 
intrusion detection for rare attacks, thus requiring additional methods to alleviate this 
constraint (Xiao et al., 2014). 
 
Review of Probabilistic Intrusion Detection Literature 
Helman and Liepins (1993) provided a foundational paper for statistical-based 
intrusion detection that other researchers have built upon. Valdes and Skinner (2000) 
addressed the shortcomings of anomaly and signature-based detection by modeling 
attacks as hypothesis and using events to adapt probabilities. This study found that 
combining signature-based and anomaly-based intrusion detection using probabilities 
improved the detection of distributed attacks (Valdes & Skinner, 2000). 
Bayesian networks have been applied to intrusion detection in a variety of 
research studies. Kruegel et al. (2003) used full Bayesian networks to model 
interdependencies of events and found a reduction in false alerts. Feng et al. (2004) found 
that dynamic Bayesian networks for recognizing time-varying plans were effective for 
predicting normal and anomalous call sequences. Gowadia et al. (2005) used agent 
graphs and Bayesian networks to evaluate beliefs, rather than hard values. This study 
found that Bayesian networks can be created by asking experts to create directed acyclic 
graphs either manually or by using an algorithm (Gowadia et al., 2005). Tylman (2008) 
combined misuse and anomaly detection methods, similar to Valdes and Skinner (2000). 
This combined approach used Bayesian classification of Snort alerts at the session level 
and found that it uncovered the structure of belief networks (Tylman, 2008).  
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Perdisci et al. (2009) applied Bayesian methods to combine the results of an 
ensemble of support vector machine classifiers. The goal of this research was to reduce 
false positives, and the results demonstrated high accuracy, especially for shellcode and 
polymorphic attacks (Perdisci et al., 2009). Xu and Shelton (2010) used continuous time 
Bayesian networks (CTBN) for anomaly detection. This application of Bayesian 
networks focused purely on event timing and outperformed existing methods for anomaly 
detection (Xu & Shelton, 2010). 
Koc et al. (2012) used hidden naïve Bayes for improving the accuracy of intrusion 
detection. This study found that hidden naïve Bayes outperformed naïve Bayes for 
accuracy and error rate while maintaining the simplicity of naïve Bayes (Koc et al., 
2012). Chivers et al. (2013) focused specifically on the problem of detecting insider 
attacks. This research study combined sources using hypotheses and Bayesian updating 
and found that updating beliefs based on evidence is effective in detecting attacker nodes 
(Chivers et al., 2013). 
Yassin et al. (2013) used k-means clustering to separate data and subsequently 
used Bayes classification. Their study found that using clustering as an initial step 
significantly reduced the false positive rate and increased the true negative rate (Yassin et 
al., 2013). Xiao et al. (2014) addressed the shortcoming of Bayesian networks using an 
ensemble approach. Bayesian network model averaging selects the best network from a 
set of trained networks and performs better than regular Bayesian networks or naïve 
Bayes (Xiao et al., 2014). Bayesian network model averaging requires less data for 
training, so it is effective for smaller training data sets (Xiao et al., 2014). 
35 
Swarnkar and Hubballi (2016) used multinomial Bayesian one-class classifiers of 
n-grams with probability trees to address the shortcomings of frequency-based and one-
class classifiers. Although this approach had a high detection rate, it was accompanied 
with a moderately high false positive rate and high computational complexity (Swarnkar 
& Hubballi, 2016). As a result, this approach is not suitable for intrusion detection, since 
moderately high false positive rates for highly imbalanced datasets results in much lower 
overall accuracy (Kruegel et al., 2003). To address the problem of high computational 
complexity and the problem of imbalanced datasets, Pajouh et al. (2017) used two-tier 
classification with linear discriminant analysis. This study found that linear discriminant 
analysis provided optimal feature reduction and made naïve Bayes more efficient for 
classification (Pajouh et al., 2017). 
 
Discussion 
Several important themes can be established from previous research. First, 
intrusion detection using probabilistic methods should avoid generalization across an 
entire dataset, since it makes it easier for criminals to hide (Scott, 2004). For example, 
data can be segmented to look at anomalies per user (Scott, 2004; Dash, Reddy, & Pujari, 
2011) or per host (Burroughs et al., 2002; Chivers et al., 2013). Second, time is an 
important element that should be considered, with a preference to more recent behaviors 
(Scott, 2004; Xu & Shelton, 2010; Chivers et al., 2013). Third, categorical data has been 
shown to perform better than parametric or continuous data for probabilistic methods for 
detecting intrusions (Scott, 2004). Fourth, several previous studies found that 
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probabilistic methods were successful in combining information from several sources, 
which is useful for aggregating event-level information to create a more abstract level. 
 
Clustering Ensembles 
Background 
The purpose of clustering is to understand natural groupings in data (Jain, 2010). 
Clustering algorithms divide data into clusters, such that the data within each cluster is 
most similar to other data in the cluster, and the data between clusters is most dissimilar 
to that of other clusters (Zhou & Tang, 2006). Clusters in data appear in various shapes, 
sizes, sparseness, and degrees of separation (Fred & Jain, 2005). Clustering identifies 
natural structures in data when the structure, the number of clusters, or shapes of the 
clusters may be unknown (Dimitriadou, Weingessel, & Hornik, 2001). Thus, clustering is 
a primary technique for unsupervised machine learning (Zhou & Tang, 2006). In addition 
to finding natural groupings and structure in data, clustering can perform natural 
classification or compression of data into cluster prototypes (Jain, 2010). 
A wide variety of clustering algorithms exist, but most can be placed into four 
categories. First, iterative square-error partitional clustering, such as k-means clustering, 
finds a distance between centroids and data elements and does not impose a structure on 
the data (Frossyniotis, Likas, & Stafylopatis, 2004; Jain, 2010). Since iterative square-
error partitional clustering uses a distance measure, it creates hyperspherical clusters and 
does not identify novel cluster shapes (Fred & Jain, 2005). Second, hierarchical 
clustering organizes data into nested sequences of groups that can be visualized as trees 
(Frossyniotis et al., 2004). Third, density-based clustering finds the densest regions of the 
feature space that are separated by low density space (Jain, 2010). Fourth, grid-based 
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clustering uses spatial data mining techniques to subdivide a hyperspace into sections that 
represent clusters (Frossyniotis et al., 2004). 
Clustering is considered a difficult problem (Jain, 2010). As a form of 
unsupervised learning, it is hard to select a clustering method in advance that can identify 
the same clusters that match those identified by a human expert (Ayad & Kamel, 2008). 
Clustering results for different clustering algorithms may be very different using the same 
data (Jain, 2010). Further, different clustering runs using the same clustering algorithm 
can have different results because of different initialization parameters (Dimitriadou et 
al., 2001).  
There is no best clustering algorithm (Jain, 2010). No single algorithm exists that 
can identify all of the cluster shapes and structures (Fred & Jain, 2005). No clustering 
method is available that will find the correct underlying structure for all data sets (Vega-
Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 337). As a result, researchers have found it is best to 
use several different clustering algorithms on a given data set and see what works best 
(Fred & Jain, 2005). Clustering algorithms are generally optimization problems that 
reduce mean-square error, minimize some other type of error, or use similarity functions 
(Dimitriadou et al., 2001). The quality of clustering can be evaluated using R-squared, 
intra-over inter-variation quotient, BD-index, and SD validity index (Frossyniotis et al., 
2004).  
Ensemble approaches have been applied to address many of the challenges 
associated with clustering. An ensemble is a multi-learner system, where each component 
learner attempts to solve the same task as the others (Strehl & Ghosh, 2002). Clustering 
ensembles were the result of research in multiple classifier systems (Dimitriadou et al., 
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2001; Hadjitodorov, Kuncheva, & Todorova, 2006). The goal of clustering ensembles is 
to find a combination of multiple partitions that improves the overall clustering of the 
data (Topchy et al., 2005). As a result, clustering ensembles find a consensus partition 
that improves that accuracy of individual clustering results (Ayad & Kamel, 2010).  
Different clustering algorithms produce different clustering results, and different 
runs of the same algorithm provide different results, because of different initialization 
parameters. Thus, using multiple clustering approaches simultaneously helps to find the 
best clustering solution (Frossyniotis et al., 2004; Jain, 2010). The benefit of clustering 
ensembles is that the decision of a group may be more reliable than that of any individual 
(Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 338). As a result, clustering ensembles reduce 
the risk of picking the wrong clustering method for a given dataset (Hadjitodorov et al., 
2006). 
Previous research has applied clustering ensembles to face recognition, character 
recognition, scientific image analysis, and medical diagnosis (Zhou & Tang, 2006). 
Research has also evaluated clustering ensembles with large datasets and has found an 
improvement in clustering, even for incomplete partitions (Lourenco et al., 2015). 
Clustering ensembles can find the right number of clusters in data (Dimitriadou et al., 
2001; Ayad & Kamel, 2010). They also improve the quality and robustness of clustering 
(Strehl & Ghosh, 2002; Topchy et al., 2005; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 365; 
Lourenco et al., 2015). Clustering ensembles identify hidden structures in data (Bakker & 
Heskes, 2003) and find clusters of arbitrary and complex shapes (Dimitriadou et al., 
2001; Frossyniotis et al., 2004; Hadjitodorov et al., 2006). As a result, they enable new 
insights into a dataset and lower the prediction error (Bakker & Heskes, 2003). Because 
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of their diversity of clustering solutions, clustering ensembles, are more generalizable 
than individual clustering algorithms (Zhou & Tang, 2006). Finally, clustering ensembles 
can be implemented in a distributed computing environment, allowing them to scale well 
for large ensembles (Strehl & Ghosh, 2002). 
Clustering ensembles can be viewed as a two-step process. The first step is to 
generate the various clustering results, also known as partitions, and the second step is to 
evaluate the results using a consensus function (Topchy, Law, Jain, & Fred, 2004; Vega-
Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 338). Figure 4 shows how these two steps fit into the 
overall concept of clustering ensembles and the notations that are used in this paper, 
which have been adapted from Vega-Pons and Ruiz-Shulcloper (2011, p. 339). 
 
 
Figure 4. Overview clustering ensembles with formal notation 
 
In this notation, 𝑋 =  {𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛} is a set of objects in which each 𝑥𝑖 is a 
multi-dimensional tuple of α dimensions and where 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛. ℙ𝑋 is the set of all 
possible partitions in X, and ℙ = {P1, P2,…., Pm} is the set of partitions generated by the 
cluster generation process, such that ℙ ∈ ℙ𝑋. As a result, each partition, 𝑃𝑖 ∈ ℙ, is made 
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up of multiple symbolic cluster labels, 𝐶𝑗
𝑖, such that 𝑃𝑖 = {𝐶1
𝑖, 𝐶2
𝑖 , … . , 𝐶𝑑
𝑖 } is a set of 
objects in X with d clusters. In Figure 4, each partition can have varying numbers of 
clusters, so the final element in the set is represented as 𝐶𝑝
1, 𝐶𝑞
2, and 𝐶𝑟
𝑚, where 𝑚 = |ℙ|, 
The variables p, q, and r, are arbitrary numbers of clusters produced in each partition, 
such that 𝐶𝑗
𝑖 represents the jth cluster in ith partition, 𝑃𝑖. The objective of clustering 
ensembles is to find a consensus partition by evaluating the partitions, 𝑃𝑖 ∈ ℙ, to find a 
clustering result, 𝑃∗ ∈ ℙ𝑋, where 𝑃
∗ is a better clustering solution than any 𝑃𝑖 ∈ ℙ. 
The cluster generation step creates multiple partitions, ℙ ∈ ℙ𝑋 , that can be used to 
find the final clustering solution, 𝑃∗ ∈ ℙ𝑋. There are few constraints on how the clusters 
are generated (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 340). The most important 
requirement of cluster generation is that multiple, diverse partitions are created (Strehl & 
Ghosh, 2002). Without diverse partitions, clustering ensembles will not be able to 
outperform single clustering algorithms (Hadjitodorov et al., 2006). The initial partitions 
can be thought of as noisy versions of true partitions (Topchy et al., 2004). As a result, 
weak and less computationally expensive clustering algorithms can be used in the initial 
cluster generation with comparable or better results than an individual clustering 
algorithm (Topchy et al., 2005). 
A variety of approaches exist for creating a diverse initial set of partitions. One 
approach for creating diverse partitions is to use different clustering algorithms 
(Hadjitodorov et al., 2006; Jain, 2010; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011). For 
example, Dimitriadou et al. (2001) implemented k-means and a competitive learning 
algorithm to generate diverse initial partitions. Another approach for creating diverse 
partitions is to use different initialization parameters with the same clustering algorithm 
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(Hadjitodorov et al., 2006; Jain, 2010; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011). This is 
commonly implemented using the k-means algorithm, since it has a variety of initial 
parameters, is not computationally expensive, and is very popular (Jain, 2010).  
Another widely used approach for generating diverse initial partitions is to use 
different representations of the data (Jain, 2010). The different representations of the data 
may include different subsets of features or a different subset of the objects in the dataset 
(Fred & Jain, 2005; Hadjitodorov et al., 2006; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011). 
Different representations of the data may also include projecting the data to different 
feature spaces (Fred & Jain, 2005), using algorithms like Principal Component Analysis 
(Strehl & Gosh, 2002). Examples of these approaches include random feature selection 
(Strehl & Gosh, 2002), bootstrapping (Bakker & Heskes, 2003), boosting (Frossyniotis et 
al., 2004), and bagging (Fred & Jain, 2005).  
Bakker and Heskes (2003) found that bootstrapping allows local summaries that 
are not possible for a single model and reduces model bias by creating a more complex 
model. In addition, bootstrapping reduces the tendency to overfit, since the models are 
not trained on the full data (Bakker & Heskes, 2003). Frossyniotis et al. (2004) found that 
boosting a clustering algorithm for a few iterations provided better results than running 
the algorithm several times and choosing the best run. 
The cluster evaluation step is one of the most difficult challenges in clustering 
ensembles (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 341). For ensembles of classifiers, 
there are labels, which make the evaluation step a straightforward problem. For clustering 
ensembles, there are no labels, which results in a correspondence problem (Dimitriadou 
et al., 2001; Strehl & Ghosh, 2002; Frossyniotis et al., 2004). Thus, cluster evaluation 
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combines diverse partitions, without labeled data, to find the true underlying partition that 
represent the natural organization of the data (Topchy et al., 2004; Tumer & Agogino, 
2008).  
 
Review of Clustering Ensemble Literature 
The earliest clustering research began with Dimitriadou et al. (2001). This 
seminal work addressed the problem that there was no clear way to combine results from 
different clustering algorithms to find a clear partition (Dimitriadou et al., 2001). Using 
voting, Dimitriadou et al. (2001) found that clustering ensembles were effective in 
finding fuzzy partitions and in finding the right number of clusters. Although this study 
was the earliest identified research on clustering ensembles, most subsequent work in 
clustering ensembles built upon the work of Strehl and Ghosh (2002). Addressing the 
same problem, Strehl and Ghosh (2002) created three new clustering algorithms: 1) 
cluster-based similarity partitioning, 2) hypergraph partitioning, and 3) meta clustering. 
They found that consensus clustering using ensembles using any of their heuristic 
algorithms was better than individual clustering results (Strehl & Ghosh, 2002). 
Bakker and Heskes (2003) contributed to ensemble-based approaches by applying 
bootstrapping. They found that using bootstrapping to summarize large ensembles into 
smaller numbers of representative models reduced overfitting, provided better prediction, 
and detected hidden structures in the data (Bakker & Heskes, 2003). Frossyniotis et al. 
(2004) addressed the combination of multiple clustering solutions by using sequential 
clustering with boosting and found that boost clustering improved the quality and 
performance of clustering (Frossyniotis et al., 2004). 
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Another important thread of literature emanated from Topchy et al. (2004). Their 
research acknowledged that clustering ensembles work but addressed the problem that 
there was no theoretical basis for why they worked (Topchy et al., 2004). This study used 
both stochastic and mean partition generation and found that consensus solutions 
converge to a true clustering solution as the number of partitions in the ensemble 
increases (Topchy et al., 2004). They also found that the probability of not discovering 
the true partition decreases exponentially as the number of partitions in the ensembles 
increases (Topchy et al., 2004). Continuing this work, Fred and Jain (2005) addressed the 
problem of identifying all cluster shapes and structures by using evidence accumulation. 
As part of this research, they proposed a theoretical framework and provided criteria for 
analysis of the combination of clustering results (Fred & Jain, 2005). Topchy et al. (2005) 
examined how to combine partitions using a consensus function by using expectancy 
maximization and mutual information consensus functions. They found that weak 
partitions may be used in clustering ensembles and still achieve comparable or better 
performance than single clustering approaches (Topchy et al., 2005). 
Hadjitodorov et al. (2006) explored how to select partitions in clustering 
ensembles by using a diversity measure. Using the Adjusted Rand Index, they found that 
ensembles with a wide spread of individual diversity were better than ensembles with less 
spread and that medium diversity clusters were the best approach (Hadjitodorov et al., 
2006). Zhou and Tang (2006) compared voting, weighted voting, selective weighting, 
and selective weighted voting and found that selective weighted voting was significantly 
better for cluster evaluation. Tumer and Agogino (2008) further compared a meta 
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clustering algorithm to voting active clusters with reinforcement learning and found that 
meta clustering was better. 
Not all previous research focused on the approaches for combining clustering 
results. Ayad and Kamel (2008) focused on reducing the computing complexity by 
beginning with the idea that consensus clustering has O(n2) complexity. By applying 
cumulative voting for identifying clustering solutions, this study improved accuracy and 
reduced computational complexity to O(n) (Ayad & Kamel, 2008). 
Azimi and Fern (2009) explored conflicting results regarding diversity of 
clustering ensembles. By using adaptive clustering ensemble selection, this study 
concluded that selection must be adaptive to accommodate the datasets, since no 
approach worked consistently for all of the datasets that were studied (Azimi & Fern, 
2009). Ayad and Kamel (2010) applied cumulative voting as a special case of linear 
regression for finding the optimum labeling of clustering ensembles. This study found 
that cumulative voting improved the accuracy and stability of results, as well provided an 
accurate estimation of the number of clusters (Ayad & Kamel, 2010). Lourenco et al. 
(2015) examined the problem that the clustering correspondence does not reflect 
uncertainty. This study used a probabilistic interpretation of Evidence Accumulation 
Clustering by using Bregman divergence and resulted in improved clustering, even for 
incomplete partitions and large datasets (Lourenco et al., 2015). 
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Review of Co-occurrence Consensus Function Literature 
Co-occurrence consensus functions analyze the number of times objects belong to 
clusters as well as the number of times two objects belong to the same clusters. Co-
occurrence functions include: 1) relabeling and voting, 2) co-association matrix, 3) graph 
and hypergraph, 4) Locally Adaptive Clustering (LAC) algorithms, 5) fuzzy methods, 6) 
information theoretic methods, and 7) finite mixture models (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-
Shulcloper, 2011, p. 353). Table 3 summarizes the co-occurrence consensus evaluation 
methods using these categories. 
 
Table 3 
Summary of Co-Occurrence Cluster Evaluation Approaches 
Method Description Studies 
Relabeling and 
Voting 
Voting process after solving 
labeling correspondence 
problem 
Dimitriadou et al. (2001); Zhou & 
Tang (2006); Ayad & Kamel 
(2008); Tumer & Agogino (2008) 
Co-Association 
Matrix 
Cluster results into an 
intermediate co-association 
matrix 
Fred & Jain (2005); Wang et al. 
(2009) 
Graph and 
Hypergraph 
Create graphs and 
hypergraphs of partitions 
and evaluate for consensus 
partition 
Strehl & Ghosh (2002); Fern & 
Brodley (2004) 
Locally Adaptive 
Clustering (LAC) 
Evaluate centroids and 
weights for numerical data 
Domeniconi & Al-Razgan (2009) 
Fuzzy Methods Evaluate clusters as soft 
partitions rather than hard 
partitions 
Frossyniotis et al. (2004); Punera & 
Ghosh (2008); Ayad & Kamel 
(2010) 
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Table 3 
Summary of Co-Occurrence Cluster Evaluation Approaches (cont.) 
Method Description Studies 
Information 
Theoretic 
Minimize entropy within 
partitions 
Strehl & Ghosh (2002); Punera & 
Ghosh (2008); Jain (2010) 
Finite Mixture 
Models 
Probabilistic modeling of 
subpopulations using a 
mixture distribution 
Topchy et al. (2005) 
 
Among the relabeling and voting approaches, Dimitriadou et al. (2001) used 
voting, based upon classification ensembles, followed by a merging procedure. Zhou and 
Tang (2006) measured similarity by counting overlap within clusters and found that 
selective weighted voting was the best of the approaches they evaluated. Ayad and Kamel 
(2008) developed a relabeling and voting approach that used cumulative voting. Tumer 
and Agogino (2008) used voting active clusters with reinforcement learning and used 
average normalized mutual information (ANMI) as an objective function. 
Co-association matrix approaches map clustering results into an intermediate 
representation, called a co-association matrix (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 
346). For example, Fred and Jain (2005) split the data into a large number of small 
spherical clusters, using k-means clustering. Next, they combined the small clusters using 
a similarity matrix. Because of this intermediate step, co-association approaches have a 
complexity of O(n2) and are limited to smaller data sets. Wang, Yang, and Zhou (2009) 
introduced probabilistic methods using a co-association matrix and introduced Bayesian 
clustering ensembles. 
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Cluster evaluation approaches that use graph and hypergraph methods transform 
the partitions into a graph or hypergraph and cut the graph to obtain a consensus partition 
(Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 347). Many of the foundational approaches to 
cluster evaluation were developed by Strehl and Ghosh (2002), who developed three 
different heuristics to evaluate hypergraphs: 1) cluster-based similarity partitioning 
algorithm (CSPA), 2) hypergraph partitioning algorithm (HGPA), and 3) meta clustering 
algorithm (MCLA). Similarly, Fern and Brodley (2004) used a graph partitioning 
approach. This approach did not actually solve for normalized mutual information in 
clusters, but instead acted more like a co-occurrence evaluation method (Vega-Pons & 
Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 349). 
LAC algorithms identify partitions within numerical features as two sets of 
information: 1) the centroids identified in the clusters, and 2) their associated weights 
(Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 355). Domeniconi and Al-Razgan (2009) 
developed three consensus functions using this approach: 1) Weighty Similarity Partition 
Algorithm (WSPA), 2) Weighty Bipartite Partition Algorithm (WBPA), and 3) Weighted 
Subspace Bipartite Partitioning Algorithm (WSBPA). These algorithms were limited in 
their use to numerical data and require that the number of clusters be specified initially 
(Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 355). 
Fuzzy methods rely on the soft nature of clustering approaches and recognize that 
there may be “fuzzy” partitions in the data (Dimitriadou et al., 2001). Some clustering 
algorithms that may be used in the cluster generation stage, such as fuzzy c-means and 
EM, already produce soft clustering results (Frossyniotis et al., 2004; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-
Shulcloper, 2011, p. 360). As a result, cluster evaluation methods that use fuzzy methods 
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do not attempt to convert the initial soft-clustering results into hard clusters. Some fuzzy 
consensus algorithms, such as voting, can perform soft or hard clustering (Ayad & 
Kamel, 2010). 
Information theoretic approaches minimize entropy within groupings (Jain, 2010). 
Strehl and Ghosh (2002) used concepts from information theory and focused on 
normalized mutual information (NMI) and average normalized mutual information 
(ANMI) as objective functions. Punera and Ghosh (2008) used soft base clustering and 
used an information theoretic approach. 
Topchy et al. (2005) used a fusion method with probabilities and based their 
solution to the consensus problem on a finite mixture model. The result was two new 
consensus functions, called quadratic mutual information (QMI) and expectation 
maximization (EM), that eliminated the need to solve the label correspondence problem 
(Topchy et al., 2005). This approach required that the data be modeled as random, 
independent variables and requires a fixed number of clusters in the final clustering 
solution (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 353). 
 
Review of Median Partition Cluster Evaluation Literature 
Median partition-based approaches are optimization problems that maximize 
similarity or minimize dissimilarity and can be divided into the following categories: 1) 
genetic algorithms, 2) nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) methods, 3) kernel 
models, and 4) Mirkin distance (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 350). Table 4 
summarizes median partition-based cluster evaluation approaches using these categories. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Median Partition Cluster Evaluation Approaches 
Method Description Studies 
Genetic Algorithms Utilize search capabilities of 
genetic algorithms to 
minimize or maximize 
distance functions 
Yoon, Ahn, Lee, Cho, & Kim 
(2006); Luo, Jing, & Xie (2006); 
Analoui & Sadighian (2006) 
Nonnegative Matrix 
Factorization (NMF) 
Find factors and 
dissimilarity using a 
nonnegative matrix  
Li, Ding, & Jordan (2007) 
Kernel Models Similarity measure between 
solutions with 
approximation 
Vega-Pons, Correa-Morris, & Ruiz 
Schulcloper (2008, 2010) 
Mirkin Distance Counting pairs of points 
within clusters and using a 
symmetric distance metric 
Gionis, Mannila, & Tsaparas 
(2007) 
 
Genetic algorithm approaches rely upon the search capabilities of genetic 
algorithms and use the highest fitness value, after some stopping criterion is reached 
(Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 354). What distinguishes genetic algorithm 
approaches is the type of fitness function employed. One approach, called heterogeneous 
clustering ensembles, used ordered pairs with a population generation mechanism and a 
fitness function to evaluate the number of overlaps between partitions within each pair 
(Yoon et al., 2006). Another approach used an information theoretic fitness function that 
minimized entropy between partitions (Luo et al., 2006). Yet another approach 
implemented the fitness function as a maximization of probability using a finite mixture 
method (Analoui & Sadighian, 2006). A challenge in using genetic algorithms for cluster 
evaluation is that different runs may produce different results because of the heuristic 
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nature of these algorithms (Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 354). It may also be 
inferred that such algorithms may settle on local minima or maxima. 
NMF methods for cluster evaluation have been used to create a median partition 
using a non-negative matrix by finding factors of the matrix and a dissimilarity measure 
between partitions (Li et al., 2007; Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011, p. 357). Kernel 
models have been used to create a median partition using a similarity measure between 
partitions and find an approximate solution (Vega-Pons et al., 2010).  
Mirkin distance approaches have been used to create a median partition by 
counting pairs. Using this approach, given two clusters, C and C', where N01 is the 
number of point pairs in C' but not in C, and N10 is the number of point pairs in the same 
partition in C but not in C', then the Mirkin distance for comparing two clusters is M(C, 
C') = 2(N01 + N10) (Meilă, 2007). When applied to clustering ensembles, the objective is 
to minimize the Mirkin distance between the partitions, and a number of heuristic 
approaches approximate this function (Gionis et al. 2007, Vega-Pons & Ruiz-Shulcloper, 
2011, p. 342).  
 
Discussion 
A number of design criteria should be considered when using clustering 
ensembles. In cluster generation, one important consideration is the number of partitions 
generated in the first stage. Dimitriadou et al. (2001) found through experimentation that 
large numbers of clusters provided the best clustering solution. Topchy et al. (2004) 
found that clustering ensembles converged more closely to a true clustering solution as 
the number of partitions in the ensemble increased. The probability of not discovering the 
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true partition decreases exponentially as the number of partitions in the ensemble 
increases (Topchy et al., 2004). Another important consideration in the clustering 
generation step is the diversity of partitions generated. There are conflicting results 
related to the diversity of initial partitions (Azimi & Fern, 2009). Ensembles with a wide 
spread of individual diversity are better than ensembles with less spread, but spread did 
not relate to accuracy (Hadjitodorov et al., 2006). As a result, medium diversity clusters 
were found to be the best approach (Hadjitodorov et al., 2006). 
In the cluster evaluation stage, there are several design criteria to consider. One 
important consideration is the objective function for determining the quality of clustering, 
such as a similarity or dissimilarity function (Zhou & Tang, 2006; Jain, 2010; Vega-Pons 
& Ruiz-Shulcloper, 2011). Another important consideration is the stopping criterion for 
determining when the best clustering solution has been identified (Dimitriadou et al., 
2001). 
Finally, several cluster evaluation strategies are computationally complex. Most 
consensus clustering algorithms have O(n2) complexity, although some have achieved 
O(n) complexity (Ayad & Kamel, 2008). Thus, the selection of a cluster evaluation 
strategy should be based on the volume of data and the computational cost of the 
algorithm.  
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Intrusion Detection Datasets 
Background 
Creating datasets for intrusion detection system evaluation is subjective, and new 
datasets face several challenges. One of the primary challenges to obtaining realistic 
intrusion data is privacy. This is because data from operational networks is the most 
realistic but is considered confidential by most network operators (Orfila, Tapiador, & 
Ribagorda, 2009). One approach to solving privacy issues is to use simulations, but these 
can be unrealistic (Orfila et al., 2009). Another approach to solving privacy concerns is to 
create datasets in test beds, but if they are too simple, they will lack realism as well 
(Milenkoski, Vieira, Kounev, Avritzer, & Payne, 2015). 
Another significant challenge in the creation of intrusion datasets is the labeling 
of normal and attack data (Orfila et al., 2009). One approach to labeling attacks is to use 
penetration testing to develop the attack data, but this has been criticized for producing 
unrealistic datasets (Wheelus, Khoshgoftaar, Zuech, & Najafabadi, 2014; Milenkoski et 
al., 2015). Another approach is to use honeypots for collection of attack data, but since 
honeypots contain mostly attack data, this too can be considered unrealistic (Milenkoski 
et al., 2015). Other approaches develop traces of normal network conditions and separate 
traces of attacks (Salem, Reissmann, & Buehler, 2014). Still other approaches use 
combinations of operational network data, penetration testing data, and simulation to 
create a more diverse, complex dataset for intrusion detection testing (Shiravi, Shiravi, 
Tavallaee, & Ghorbani, 2012; Moustafa & Slay, 2015; Singh, Kumar, & Singla, 2015; 
Haider, Hu, Slay, Turnbull, & Xie, 2017). 
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Other research on intrusion detection datasets includes methods and software 
tools that aid in the creation of intrusion datasets. For example, Shiravi et al. (2012) 
created software agents for generating normal network activity and attack activity in test 
beds. Salem et al. (2014) developed the OptiFilter toolkit, which can be deployed in large 
networks to create continuous datasets for intrusion detection evaluation. 
Vasilomanolakis, Cordero, Milanov, and Mühlhäuser (2016) developed the ID2T toolkit 
for injecting synthetic attacks into real network packet capture data. Lin, Lin, Wang, 
Chen, and Lai (2016) developed PCAPLib to automatically extract, classify, and 
anonymize packet capture data.  
 
Review of Intrusion Detection Dataset Literature 
The KDD Cup 1999 intrusion detection dataset set a standard for many years for 
evaluating intrusion detection approaches. The source data for this dataset came from 
DARPA’s MIT Lincoln Labs collection of network packet information called IDEVAL 
(Cao et al., 2013). The KDD Cup 1999 dataset was prepared by Stolfo, Fan, Lee, 
Prodromidis, and Chan (2000) and was based upon the IDEVAL network packet data, 
which contained seven weeks of network traffic. The KDD Cup 1999 dataset was 
specifically prepared for the KDD competition (Cao et al., 2013). The KDD Cup 1999 
training dataset includes approximately 4.9 million connection records and is labeled as 
either normal or with a specific attack vector (Tavallaee et al., 2009). The attacks in the 
KDD Cup 1999 dataset fall into four categories: 1) denial of service attack, 2) user to root 
attacks, 3) remote to local attacks, and 4) probing attacks (Tavallaee et al., 2009). 
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Over time, the KDD Cup 1999 dataset has been criticized by researchers for three 
primary reasons. First, the characteristics of networks have changed since KDD Cup 
1999 was created (Qian et al., 2006). For example, the KDD Cup 1999 dataset was 
collected on the Solaris operating system, used older applications and operating system 
approaches, and represented a time when attacks generally were against only a single 
system process at one time (Creech & Hu, 2013). Second, the KDD Cup 1999 dataset 
contains 78% duplicate records in the training dataset and 75% duplication in the testing 
dataset, which may lead to problems of overfitting (Tavallaee et al., 2009). Third, the 
number of records in the KDD Cup 1999 dataset are too numerous, so many researchers 
use only subsets of these datasets. This leads to an inconsistent basis for comparison 
between intrusion detection systems (Tavallaee et al., 2009). 
In response to the criticisms of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset, a number of 
researchers have proposed alternative datasets. Table 5 provides a summary of many 
notable intrusion detection datasets that have been created as potential alternatives to the 
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Most notable among these are Gure KDD Cup (Perona et al. 
2008), NSL-KDD (Tavallaee et al., 2009), MAWILab (Fontugne, Borgnat, Abry, 
Fukuda, 2010), ADFA-LD12 (Creech & Hu, 2013), UNSW-NB15 (Moustafa & Slay, 
2015), and NGIDS-DS (Haider et al., 2017). 
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Table 5 
Summary of Intrusion Detection Dataset Research 
Study Data Type Approach Contributions 
Stolfo et al. 
(2000) 
Network 
packet data 
Extraction of features 
from DARPA 1998 
dataset 
Produced the KDD Cup 
1999 dataset. Found that 
fraud detection can be 
generalized to intrusion 
detection. 
Qian et al., (2006) Network 
packets and 
audit logs 
Simulation based on 
university laboratory 
LAN 
Feasibility of creating 
synthetic IDS testing data. 
Data is more useful at user 
level than at packet level. 
Perona et al. 
(2008) 
Network 
packed data 
Combined KDD Cup 
1999 dataset with 
DARPA 1998 
payload data  
Produced Gure KDD Cup 
dataset. Including payload 
and header data improves 
detection. 
Tavallaee et al. 
(2009) 
Network 
and host 
data 
Subset of KDD-Cup 
1999 dataset to 
remove redundancy 
and duplicates 
Created NSL-KDD dataset, 
which is an improved 
distribution of data for IDS 
testing. Still suffers from 
unrealistic network data. 
Fontugne et al. 
(2010) 
Network 
data 
Combined anomaly 
detection results from 
MAWI archive by 
using SCANN 
Created MAWILab dataset, 
which is updated daily. 
Labeled as Anomalous, 
Suspicious, Notice, and 
Benign.  
Gogoi, Bhuyan, 
Bhattacharyya, & 
Kalita (2012) 
Network 
packet and 
flow data 
Captured from test 
bed with over 350 
nodes with automated 
attacks 
Produced TUIDS DDoS 
dataset. 
Shiravi et al. 
(2012) 
Network 
packet data 
Test bed with 21 
workstations using α 
and β profiles to 
generate dynamic test 
data 
Established criteria for 
evaluating datasets: realistic 
network, realistic traffic, 
labeled dataset, total 
interaction capture, complete 
capture, and diverse attacks. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Intrusion Detection Dataset Research (Cont.) 
Study Data Type Approach Contributions 
Cao et al. (2013) Network 
packet data 
Test bed similar to 
that used for DARPA 
1998 data 
Produced LUT13 dataset. 
Better in comparison to the 
KDD Cup 1999 dataset for 
generalizable detection. 
Creech & Hu 
(2013) 
Audit log 
data 
Single Ubuntu Linux 
server with common 
software applications 
with normal and 
attack traces 
Produced ADFA-LD12 
dataset. Evaluation shows 
this dataset has more 
complexity than KDD Cup 
1999. 
Wheelus et al. 
(2014) 
Network 
packet and 
flow data 
Collected data from 
internet service 
provider and 
manually labeled 
Produced SANTA dataset, 
which features realistic 
normal traffic, penetration 
testing traffic, real attacks, 
and modern attack types. 
Moustafa & Slay 
(2015) 
Network 
packet data 
Synthetic generation 
using IXIA Perfect 
Storm hardware 
Produced synthetically 
realistic, labeled dataset 
called UNSW-NB15. 
Singh et al. (2015) Network 
and host 
data 
Statistical approach to 
generate a new dataset 
using NSL-KDD as a 
base dataset 
Created Panjab University 
Intrusion Data Set (PU-IDS). 
Haider et al. 
(2017) 
Network 
packet and 
audit log 
data 
Synthetic generation 
using IXIA Perfect 
Storm hardware 
Produced synthetically 
realistic, labeled dataset 
called NGIDS-DS. 
Developed evaluation 
criteria for intrusion datasets. 
 
 
Discussion 
At present, there is not an accepted standard for evaluating the quality and 
usefulness of intrusion detection datasets. Milenkoski et al. (2015) surveyed intrusion 
detection research literature and developed a method of categorizing intrusion detection 
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evaluation. Their work was inconclusive in offering a standard for evaluation, but it did 
provide an overview of the complexities inherent in this area of research. Most recently, 
Haider et al. (2017) developed evaluation criteria that consists of six factors: 1) 
completeness of capture of audit logs and network packets, 2) inclusion of maximum 
possible attacks, 3) representative of current attack behaviors, 4) inclusive of real world 
normal traffic that includes realistic timing and complexity, 5) capture of system 
maintenance activity that occurs in real operational networks, and 6) ground truth 
labeling to represent normal traffic. Since it is a more recent study the Haider et al. 
(2017) evaluation criteria may become an accepted standard, but this will require time 
and a critical analysis by future researchers. 
Since its inception, the UNSW-NB15 dataset has been gaining adoption from 
researchers. It is commonly used alongside other datasets. For example, Bamakan, Wang, 
and Shi (2017) applied both the UNSW-NB15 and NSL-KDD datasets to multi-class 
intrusion detection using Ramp Loss K-Support Vector Classification-Regression. 
Kamarudin, Maple, Watson, and Safa (2017) used both UNSW-NB15 and NSL-KDD to 
test an ensemble classifier used for anomaly detection. Hajisalem and Babaie (2018) used 
both the UNSW-NB15 and the NSL-KDD datasets to test a new hybrid intrusion 
detection system using artificial bee colony and artificial fish swarm algorithms. 
Papamartzivanos, Mármol, and Kambourakis (2018) used UNSW-NB15, NSL-KDD, and 
KDD Cup 1999 for rule induction for intrusion detection. With these recent studies in 
mind, it has become an accepted practice to use both the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 
datasets to test intrusion detection algorithms. 
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Summary 
This chapter reviewed and synthesized relevant research in the areas of CSA, 
intrusion detection, probabilistic intrusion detection, clustering ensembles, and intrusion 
detection datasets. CSA uses observations of individual events in the broader context of 
the situation at hand, with a goal of predicting future states. Intrusion detection is a 
method for detecting attacks based upon either signatures of known attacks or the 
identification of anomalies. Intrusion detection has contributed to the first level of CSA, 
in that it provides individual events for evaluating the situation under conditions of 
uncertainty. Probabilistic intrusion detection methods have been effective in intrusion 
detection, which provides support for the approach in this research. Clustering ensembles 
provide multiple perspectives of a dataset and are effective in detecting patterns and 
anomalies in data without prior knowledge of the structures of the data.  
In addition, this chapter provided a detailed overview of intrusion detection 
datasets. It presented the challenges associated with selecting and generating such 
datasets for research. Several criteria should be considered to ensure the suitability of 
datasets for evaluating intrusion detection systems. Datasets should be complete and be 
representative of current attack behaviors with suitable complexity to reflect operational 
networks. Further, they should either be labeled with specific attack types or include a 
ground truth labeling to separate normal from anomalous data. Using both the UNSW-
NB15 and NSL-KDD datasets to test intrusion detection systems has become a common 
practice in research.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the approach that was used for implementing and 
evaluating the effectiveness of the experiments. This research used clustering ensembles, 
bagging, probability analysis, and active learning. The result was the probability that a 
computer system was being attacked, based on the event-level observation of anomalies 
that were identified using clustering ensembles. The resulting solution not only provided 
unsupervised intrusion detection but also, by incorporating active learning, allowed a 
level of human interaction by subject matter experts with domain knowledge. This 
solution evolved through three experimental stages.  
In the first experiment, an algorithm for cluster generation with bagging was 
developed. This experiment evaluated and compared different existing cluster generation 
parameters to determine their suitability for deriving meaning from intrusion detection 
datasets. The second experiment developed an algorithm for probabilistic anomaly 
detection, using the clustering ensemble results. The third and final experiment 
incorporated active learning to allow domain knowledge from subject matter experts. 
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Solution Design 
A multi-stage algorithm was developed that generated a diverse set of initial 
partitions, evaluated the results of the initial clustering to detect anomalies, and processed 
the output, while incorporating subject matter expert feedback. Figure 5 summarizes the 
high-level design of the solution and includes important design considerations that are 
described in more detail in this chapter. 
 
Figure 5. High level solution design 
 
Dataset 
The selection of a dataset for evaluating intrusion detection systems is important 
for allowing algorithms and approaches to be compared to each other (Milenkoski et al., 
2015). Prior research has found that intrusion detection datasets should be realistic, 
publicly available, and provide ground truth data (Shiravi et al., 2012; Haider et al., 
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2017). For this research, it was also important that the dataset identified the specific 
computer systems that were experiencing normal or attack activity.  
Two datasets were used in evaluating this solution. First, the NSL-KDD dataset 
was used as a general dataset that connected this research with prior studies. Although 
this dataset is outdated, it provided a basis of comparison with a dataset that lacks the 
complexity of more contemporary intrusion datasets. Since the NSL-KDD dataset does 
not identify specific computer systems, it could only be used to evaluate the clustering 
ensemble approaches and preliminary anomaly detection at the event level. It was not 
used to evaluate the probability that a specific computer system was being attacked.  
The second dataset that was be used throughout this research was the UNSW-
NB15 dataset, which was created by Moustafa and Slay (2015). One of the most 
important features of the UNSW-NB15 dataset was that it identified specific computer 
systems with a source IP address and a destination IP address. This allowed the 
evaluation of the probability that a specific computer system was under attack. This 
dataset is more current than the NSL-KDD dataset, and so it reflects more current attacks. 
It is also a more complex dataset for intrusion detection, which means that it is more 
difficult to detect attacks, and better tested the capabilities of the algorithm. 
 
Cluster Generation with Bagging 
The cluster generation stage of the solution was evaluated using a variety of 
criteria. First, an appropriate clustering algorithm was needed that had reasonable 
computational complexity and that was well-suited for the dataset. It was expected that k-
means clustering would be suitable for this clustering. The need for diversity in the 
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clustering results was accomplished using bagging, which selected random features from 
the dataset to provide diversity. As a result, it was not expected that this solution would 
require diverse algorithms. 
Another important criteria in developing the cluster generation stage was the 
number of partitions to generate. Previous studies found that sufficient partitions are 
needed to provide diversity, but they also found that a medium diversity approach 
performed better than a larger diversity solution (Azimi & Fern, 2009). This was 
important for evaluation to identify the number of clusters that provide the optimal 
diversity. 
 
Anomaly Detection 
The anomaly detection stage contained two important algorithms. The first 
algorithm evaluated the clustering ensemble results to find anomalies. This algorithm 
differed from other clustering ensemble approaches in that its objective was not to find 
common clusters, but instead to find the anomalies. This overcame the clustering 
correlation problem, which arises from the lack of labels, thus simplifying the problem of 
cluster evaluation. 
This algorithm first evaluated each partition to determine which clustering labels 
represented anomalies. To accomplish this, the algorithm used counting and statistical 
analysis of the clusters to determine which of the clusters in the partition were 
inconsistent with the others. It was expected that anomalous clusters could be detected as 
follows: 
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𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦 = {
0, 𝜇𝑐 − 𝐾𝜎𝐶 ≤ |𝐶𝑖| ≤ 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶
1, (|𝐶𝑖| < 𝜇𝐶 − 𝐾𝜎𝐶) ∪ (|𝐶𝑖| > 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶)
 (4) 
 
In this case, |𝐶𝑖| is the number of events identified in cluster, 𝐶𝑖. This number of 
records was compared to the mean of the number of events in all of the clusters, 𝜇𝐶, 
minus a constant, K, number of standard deviations, 𝜎𝐶. Thus, a cluster would be 
considered an anomaly when the number of records in it is outside of the interval of 
𝐾standard deviations from the mean number of records in each cluster. The value for 
𝐾was determined experimentally to find an appropriate threshold. This algorithm was 
tested and updated based on observations in the data. 
Next, the algorithm evaluated each event, E, in the dataset to determine the 
probability that the event was an anomaly, P(𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦). This evaluation would be based 
on the number of clusters to which it was assigned that were considered anomalies 
divided by the total number of clusters. It was expected that event-level anomalies could 
be detected as: 
P(𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (5) 
The result, P(𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦), represents the probability that an event is an anomaly, 
based on the number of partitions that found it was an anomaly. If this probability needed 
to be converted into a binary result, a threshold probability would be selected to 
determine when the probability represents an anomaly. Instead, the probability was 
preserved as a soft metric and was passed to the second algorithm. This algorithm also 
was tested and updated based on observations in the data. 
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The second algorithm in the anomaly detection stage determined the probability 
that a computer system was being attacked, based on the observation of one or more 
anomalies. Given the probability that a computer system was being attacked as P(A) and 
the probability that an individual event is an anomaly, P(E), this solution assumed that 
prior to any observations, the probability that a computer was under attack would be 
uncertain, thus: 
P(𝐴) = 0.5 (6) 
 
Further, given the initial probability that the computer system was under attack 
and an observation of an anomalous event, the probability of an event being an attack, 
given that a computer system being attacked, would be: 
 
P(𝐸|𝐴) = P(𝐴) × P(𝐸) (7) 
 
Following the observation of an event, it would be reasonable to update the prior 
probability to reflect the greater certainty, based on the probability of the observation. 
Therefore, given a number of observations, N, it was expected that the probability that a 
computer system is being attacked would be: 
 
P(𝐴) = P(𝐴) +
1
𝑁
∑ P(𝐸𝑖|𝐴) − 0.5
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (8) 
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The probability portion of the algorithm was developed based on these 
assumptions and was modified, as needed, through evaluation of the experimental results. 
 
Active Learning 
The active learning portion of this solution was built upon previous approaches 
developed by McElwee (2017). Active learning is successful in separating normal from 
attack traffic using minimal labeling (McElwee, 2017). Areas for improvement include 
more detailed evaluation of the sampling, as well as the use of an improved oracle that 
allows the detection of certain rare attacks (McElwee, 2017). 
In addition to sampling the events to be sent to the oracle for labeling, this stage 
of the algorithm determined how to use this feedback to influence the outcome of the 
anomaly detection. The two most likely opportunities evaluated were to override the 
probability that an event was indeed anomalous, P(E), or to use the oracle’s response to 
update the prior probability that the computer system was under attack, P(A). The 
approach for active learning was finalized during the implementation and testing of the 
third experiment. 
 
Experiment 1: Cluster Generation 
The first experiment evaluated cluster generation strategies. This experiment 
focused on the k-means clustering algorithm and used bagging to generate a variety of 
clustering results. This experiment first required the implementation of a cluster 
generation algorithm that was configurable for a number of parameters. The k-means 
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clustering algorithm was used for this experiment, since it is a widely accepted algorithm 
that produces hyperspherical clusters with a relatively low computational complexity. 
This experiment determined the number of partitions, ℙ, to generate, such that the 
partitions were a subset of all possible partitions, ℙ ∈  ℙ𝐾. A partition is a result from a 
clustering solution that contains one or more clusters, 𝑃𝑁 ∈ ℙ, such that 𝑃𝑁 =
{𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3, … 𝐶𝑘}. As a result, there were a configurable number of partitions in ℙ.  
By implementing bagging, each partition had a pseudorandom number of clusters 
that were generated and were based on a pseudorandom number of features. The result 
was a diverse set of features, a diverse set of partitions with different clustering results, 
and a generalizable clustering solution. Using bagging helped to prevent the problem of 
overfitting. 
 
Experimental Design 
The algorithm that was used to implement the cluster generation is shown in 
Figure 6. After predetermining the number of partitions, N, to generate, this algorithm 
created a sampling plan that was based upon the number of features provided in the 
dataset. For each partition, the sampling plan included a selection of features to use from 
the dataset. The values that were selected in the sampling plan were determined 
experimentally, with the objective of optimizing the clustering results while minimizing 
computational complexity. 
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Figure 6. Algorithm for cluster generation 
 
Following the sampling plan, the algorithm generated N partitions using the k-
means clustering algorithm. The partitions were stored in a data structure that was used in 
subsequent stages of the intrusion detection solution, but this data was also available for 
export to a CSV file for off-line analysis. An evaluation step was included in this 
algorithm, since it is expected that some of the pseudorandom clustering solutions 
defined in the sampling plan would not cluster well and could be discarded immediately. 
 
Evaluation 
The results of this experiment were analyzed using statistical frequency analysis 
of a variety of experimental runs. The focus of this experiment was to determine the 
optimal settings for cluster generation before moving on to the next experiment. 
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Experiment 2: Probabilistic Anomaly Detection 
The second experiment focused on two algorithms. First, it implemented and 
evaluated the effectiveness of using the cluster generation results to identify anomalous 
events. Second, it implemented and evaluated the probability that a computer host was 
being attacked.  
 
Experimental Design 
Figure 7 shows an overview of the algorithm that was developed for this 
experiment. The input to this algorithm was the set of partitions that were developed in 
the first experiment. For each partition in the set, the algorithm determined if each cluster 
in the partition was an anomaly. From this a probability was calculated to determine if an 
event represented an attack, P(E). After computing P(E) for each event, these 
probabilities were used to update a list of each computer system to reflect the probability 
that the computer system was being attacked, P(A).  
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Figure 7. Algorithm for probabilistic anomaly detection 
 
It was expected that the computational complexity would be approximately 
O(2n), where n is the number of events in the dataset. It was also expected that the 
computational complexity of cluster anomaly evaluation would be negligible, since it was 
limited by the number of partitions. Further, it was expected that the loop through each 
event would have a linear computation requirement and would thus be O(n). The 
evaluation to determine if a computer system was compromised would be limited to the 
number of computer systems times the average number of events per computer system, 
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which should be approximately O(n). This appears to be reasonable for large intrusion 
datasets and this was evaluated as part of this experiment. 
 
Evaluation 
The results of this experiment were evaluated for accuracy compared to the 
ground truth data provided with the datasets. For the NSL-KDD dataset, this experiment 
only evaluated the accuracy of the anomaly detection at the event level, since individual 
computer systems were not identified in this dataset. For the UNSW-NB15 dataset, this 
experiment evaluated both the accuracy of the anomaly detection and threshold at which 
a computer system’s probability of attack was reasonable.  
To evaluate the accuracy of the probability that an event is anomalous, it was 
expected that a threshold probability would be selected to represent an event as an attack. 
Then the accuracy and error rates would be calculated as: 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 (9) 
 
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 1 − 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (10) 
 
To evaluate the probability that a computer system was being attacked, it was 
expected that subsets of the data would need to be presented to the algorithm to create a 
variety of scenarios to simulate targeted attacks against a reduced number of computer 
systems; however, after analysis of the datasets, the entire dataset was presented to the 
algorithm. The evaluation included the numbers of normal and attack records injected 
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into the algorithm along with a comparison of the probabilities of a computer system 
being attacked.  
 
Experiment 3: Active Learning 
The third experiment incorporated active learning into the overall solution. In this 
context, active learning was implemented to sample certain unlabeled data that would be 
sent to the oracle. An oracle is an entity that knows what the correct label is for the data 
and represents a human subject matter expert. The objective was to minimize the amount 
of data that needed to be sent to the oracle while ensuring that sufficient labels were 
provided to improve the overall machine learning output. Since this experiment included 
datasets that had ground truth data to distinguish between attacks and normal events, the 
oracle was created programmatically, rather than relying on a human subject matter 
expert. 
The queries to the oracle were used to determine if an event was an attack or 
normal, as well as to determine if the probability that a computer system being attacked 
was correct. Thus, the oracle stored ground truth information for both types of events. 
The specific events and computer systems that were presented to the oracle were based 
on a sampling strategy that was built upon prior research (McElwee, 2017). The results 
were compared to arrive at a recommended sampling approach. 
The incorporation of the feedback into the probabilistic anomaly detection portion 
of the solution was determined after the second experiment had been completed. It was 
expected that the results of the active learning would be used to update P(E) prior to 
updating P(A) for a computer system. It was also expected that the active learning results 
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could also update P(A) directly, based on feedback that a computer system was not being 
attacked. 
 
Evaluation 
The accuracy results from Experiment 2 were used as a basis of comparison for 
this experiment. The objective was to improve the accuracy of the overall solution by 
incorporating domain knowledge from subject matter experts, as represented by the 
oracle. In addition, this experiment evaluated the accuracy compared to the number of 
requests sent to the oracle, since it was obvious that if all events and computer system-
level decisions were sent to the oracle, then 100% accuracy could have been achieved. 
Thus, it was expected that there would be a sigmoid curve when the accuracy was plotted 
against the number of requests sent to the oracle. 
  
Resource Requirements 
This research had three primary resource requirements. First, datasets for 
intrusion detection were required as the input. This research did not create a new 
intrusion detection dataset, but rather relied upon existing, publicly available datasets. As 
mentioned previously, the two datasets that were used for this research were the NSL-
KDD and UNSW-NB15 datasets. 
The second resource requirement was a development environment, including 
computing hardware, programming languages, and libraries for data handling and 
machine learning. The development environment consisted of a laptop computer running 
Microsoft Windows 10. The intrusion detection system and algorithms were developed 
73 
using Python and the PyCharm integrated development environment. Programming 
libraries that were implemented in this research included scikit-learn machine learning 
algorithms and pandas DataFrames. TensorFlow was considered for its deferred 
processing capabilities and its ability to use GPU processing, but it was not used in this 
research. 
The third resource requirement was an environment for processing the data using 
the algorithms that had been developed. Most of these algorithms performed satisfactorily 
in the development environment, but cloud computing services were used to provide 
additional processing capabilities that reduced the computation time for cluster 
generation. 
 
Summary 
This chapter introduced the approach for probabilistic clustering ensembles with 
active learning for intrusion detection. It provided a high-level overview of the solution 
and the algorithms, as well as details regarding the datasets that were used. This chapter 
included the approach that was used for cluster generation and the method for 
probabilistic anomaly detection. This chapter also provided an overview of how active 
learning would be applied after the probabilistic anomaly detection function was 
finalized.  
This chapter described the testing and evaluation approaches that were used 
through a series of three experiments. The first experiment focused on cluster generation 
to evaluate the optimal way to generate diverse clustering solutions that were used later 
for anomaly detection. The second experiment focused on probabilistic anomaly 
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detection by applying probabilistic reasoning to the observation of events, leading to the 
probability that a computer system was being attacked. Finally, the third experiment 
enhanced the solution with active learning approaches and compared the accuracy to that 
of the probabilistic anomaly detection experiment. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the implementation and results of the three experiments 
conducted in this research. It details the design and implementation of the algorithms by 
using a class diagram and a description of the classes. Next, this chapter describes the 
selected datasets and preprocessing.  
This chapter presents the design of each experiment as well as the evaluation 
approach, observations, and preliminary conclusions. The first experiment implemented 
and evaluated cluster generation, and the results, which were surprising, were 
foundational to the remainder of the experiments. The second experiment implemented 
the anomaly detection algorithm and evaluated the use of the partitions of clustering 
results to find both the probability that an event was an anomaly, P(E), and the 
probability that a computer system was under attack, P(A). Once again, the results were 
different than expected, but demonstrated the success of the algorithm. Finally, the third 
experiment implemented active learning to update P(A) by correctly labeling a sampling 
of events for the computer systems that were found to have anomalies. The result was 
that false positives were eliminated after updating the labels of a small number of events. 
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Experiment Design and Implementation 
The experiments implemented the algorithms defined in Figures 6 and 7 in 
Chapter 3, Methodology. The experiments were implemented using object-oriented 
design with Python 2.7 using custom classes. In addition, existing libraries were used, 
such as pandas and scikit-learn. Figure 8 illustrates the class diagram that was used for 
the experiments. 
 
Figure 8. Class diagram 
 
CEPIDS Class 
The class name, CEPIDS, is the acronym for Clustering Ensemble Probabilistic 
Intrusion Detection System. This class is responsible for the high-level execution of the 
algorithm, the calculation of P(E) for events, the calculation of P(A) for computer 
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systems, and for implementing the active learning. It contains a main() function that 
allows it to be executed directly for complete execution of cluster generation, 
probabilistic anomaly detection, and active learning. The main() function orchestrates the 
experiments. The CEPIDS class instantiates objects from the subsequent classes, 
NSLKDD, UNSW, and PartitionGenerator.  
 
NSLKDD and UNSW Classes 
The NSLKDD and UNSW classes allowed their representative datasets to be 
loaded from a file and preprocessed. After loading and preprocessing the datasets, these 
classes could return a DataFrame that represented the full dataset, a list of features, or a 
list of labels to allow for post processing and evaluation. Although these two datasets 
have different sets of features, using the same functions in each class allowed the 
implementation of each dataset to be abstracted and allowed the classes to be used 
interchangeably in the CEPIDS class. As a result, these experiments can be extended to 
other datasets by implementing the specific details of the dataset in a new dataset class 
without modifying the logic of the algorithms. The NSLKDD and UNSW classes were 
implemented in a single Python package, called datasets.py, which contained global 
functions for preprocessing, such as filling in missing data values, encoding categorical 
features, and scaling values to a range. 
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PartitionGenerator Class 
The PartitionGenerator class implemented the cluster generation. The 
initialization of this class required an instantiated dataset object, which could be either of 
the NSLKDD or UNSW classes. The class initialization also included configurable 
parameters for selecting the number of partitions to generate, the minimum and 
maximum ratio of features to include in generating the partitions, as well as the minimum 
and maximum number of clusters to generate in each partition. Using the upper and lower 
bounds of features and the number of clusters, the initialization of this class selected 
pseudorandom numbers within those bounds. After the initialization was completed, the 
cluster labels were retrieved using the get_labels() function, which returned a list of 
numeric cluster labels for each partition. Each list of cluster labels followed the order of 
the original dataset, which allowed them to be joined directly with the original dataset as 
new features. 
 
Development Environment 
The development environment for the experiments in this research used PyCharm 
for Python development. Source code was controlled in a private github repository. Most 
experiments were conducted on a Lenovo laptop with an Intel Core i7 CPU running at 2.1 
GHz, with 8 GB of memory, and with the Windows 10 operating system. Cluster 
generation was found to be the most computationally complex problem, so to generate 
sufficient numbers of clustering ensemble results for validation, Amazon EC2 instances 
were also used. These instances were optimized for computational work, with 3 GHz, 
Intel Xeon Platinum CPUs and 8 GB of memory. The EC2 instances allowed 10 
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simultaneous executions of the cluster generation, with 100 partitions per execution. This 
reduced the time to generate 10 sets of partitions to the same time it took to produce a 
single set.  
 
Input Dataset Analysis and Preparation 
The first step in conducting the experiments was to evaluate the datasets and 
preprocessing requirements that were needed. This preparation work was performed 
using Microsoft Excel pivot tables. This allowed various ways of examining the datasets 
to understand their characteristics.  
 
NSL-KDD 
NSL-KDD was one of the datasets used for this research. The NSL-KDD dataset 
is a subset of the KDD Cup 1999 dataset that eliminates duplication. An analysis of the 
composition of the NSL-KDD training dataset found that it contained only 53% normal 
records. An important assumption of this research is that network events are highly 
imbalanced, with a predominant number of normal records and a very small number of 
attack records. Since nearly half of this dataset contained attacks, it could not be 
considered as representative of normal network conditions, which might only contain a 
very small percentage of attacks. To compensate for this even distribution of normal and 
attack records, a derived dataset was prepared that contained a subset of the events from 
the NSL-KDD dataset. By eliminating the denial of service records, the resulting dataset 
contained 98% normal records and was more representative of a realistic network that 
was experiencing targeted attacks. All subsequent experiments using the NSL-KDD 
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dataset used this derived dataset. Table 6 shows the distribution of classes in both the 
original and the derived datasets. 
 
Table 6 
Original and Derived NSL-KDD Dataset Label Distributions  
Original Dataset 
  
Derived Dataset 
Label Records  % Total 
 
Label  Records  % Total 
Normal 67,343 53% 
 
normal 67,343 98% 
neptune 41,214 33% 
 
warezclient 890 1% 
Satan 3,633 3% 
 
guess_passwd 53 0% 
ipsweep 3,599 3% 
 
buffer_overflow 30 0% 
portsweep 2,931 2% 
 
warezmaster 20 0% 
Smurf 2,646 2% 
 
land 18 0% 
Nmap 1,493 1% 
 
imap 11 0% 
Back 956 1% 
 
rootkit 10 0% 
teardrop 892 1% 
 
loadmodule 9 0% 
warezclient 890 1% 
 
ftp_write 8 0% 
Pod 201 0% 
 
multihop 7 0% 
guess_passwd 53 0% 
 
phf 4 0% 
buffer_overflow 30 0% 
 
perl 3 0% 
warezmaster 20 0% 
 
spy 2 0% 
Land 18 0% 
 
Total 68,408 100% 
Imap 11 0% 
    
Rootkit 10 0% 
    
loadmodule 9 0% 
    
ftp_write 8 0% 
    
multihop 7 0% 
    
Phf 4 0% 
    
Perl 3 0% 
    
Spy 2 0% 
    
Total 125,973 100% 
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UNSW-NB15 
The UNSW-NB15 dataset includes a variety of files. First, this dataset includes 
full packet capture data that was the source data for all subsequent files generated for this 
dataset. Next, it includes a training and testing dataset that was created using the packet 
capture data and is well-suited for machine learning. This data is similar in composition 
to the NSL-KDD dataset in that it does not include computer system identifiers, such as 
IP addresses. As a result, these files were not useful for this research. The UNSW-NB15 
dataset includes four comma separated value files that were generated from the packet 
capture data using Argus, Bro, and customized algorithms. These files each represent 
network connection events that include source and destination IP addresses for each 
event. It is this set of data that was used for this research, since it included the classes of 
the events and uniquely identified the source destination IP addresses. The classes of 
events in this dataset consisted of: Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS, Exploits, Generic, 
Reconnaissance, Shellcode, Worms, and Normal.  
The experiments used one of the four files, UNSW-NB15_1.csv, which contained 
700,001 events, 44 unique destination IP addresses, and 40 unique source IP addresses. It 
was representative of the other datasets. This file was highly imbalanced, consisting of 
97% normal records. As a result, no modifications or derived datasets were needed. Table 
7 shows the distribution of classes in this dataset. 
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Table 7 
UNSW-NB15_1 Dataset Label Distributions  
Label Records PctTotal 
Normal 677,786 96.8% 
Generic 7,522 1.1% 
Exploits 5,409 0.8% 
Fuzzers 5,051 0.7% 
Reconnaissance 1,759 0.3% 
DoS 1,167 0.2% 
Backdoors 534 0.1% 
Analysis 526 0.1% 
Shellcode 223 0.0% 
Worms 24 0.0% 
Total 700,001 100% 
 
 
Experiment 1: Cluster Generation 
Design 
The purpose of the first experiment was to build a foundation of cluster 
generation that could be used in subsequent experiments. All clustering performed in this 
experiment used the k-means clustering algorithm. It was important to ensure that each of 
the partitions of clustering results was diverse, so that the resulting partitions represented 
multiple perspectives of the data groupings. To generate diverse clusters, this experiment 
began with a bagging plan that included a pseudorandom set of features and a 
pseudorandom number of clusters per partition. As a result, each partition was built using 
a different number of features from the original dataset, and those features were randomly 
selected. Each partition also had a different number of clusters.   
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To select the features to be used in each partition, this experiment was constructed 
to be generalizable to other datasets. As a result, the bagging plan included a maximum 
of 75% of the available features from the original dataset, and a lower limit of 25%. For 
example, the UNSW-NB15 dataset contains 49 features, including a label and an attack 
category. Since the label and the attack category represent the class of each event, this 
dataset has 47 features that are useful for clustering. Thus, the number of features that 
were clustered in each of the partitions generated for the UNSW-NB15 dataset ranged 
from 12 to 35. 
To select the number of clusters to generate for each partition, this experiment 
included parameters for the minimum and maximum number of clusters to generate. 
Initial experiments used low numbers of clusters, such as a minimum of four and a 
maximum of 20. The results were analyzed using Microsoft Excel pivot tables, and the 
result was that each cluster had a predominantly high number of normal records. The 
ranges were expanded until a more reasonable distribution of normal records was 
identified. The final range for the number of clusters in each partition was a minimum of 
40 and a maximum of 100. Increasing the upper limit further may have improved the 
distribution of events in each cluster, but higher numbers of clusters required more 
computational processing time, so a maximum of 100 was selected as a trade-off between 
performance and diversity. Prior research showed that ensembles of weak clusterers were 
better than single clustering algorithms, so it was expected that any limitations of cluster 
generation would be offset in the cluster evaluation stage (Topchy et al., 2005). 
The first experiment produced a DataFrame and an output file that were used for 
the evaluation of the results as well as for the input to the second experiment. Each 
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partition that was generated was represented as a feature appended to the original dataset. 
Each partition was assigned a feature name that began with the letter P and was followed 
by the partition number, such as P0 through P99. The values that were populated in the 
partitions were integers that represented the clustering labels for each partition. Initial 
experiments began with as few as 10 partitions and went as high as 100 partitions to 
provide a diverse set of clustering solutions for the second experiment. 
 
Analysis 
The most important analysis in this first experiment was to determine if there was 
a clustering generation strategy that would allow anomalies to be detected according to 
the formula: 
𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦 = {
0, 𝜇𝑐 − 𝐾𝜎𝐶 ≤ |𝐶𝑖| ≤ 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶
1, (|𝐶𝑖| < 𝜇𝐶 − 𝐾𝜎𝐶) ∪ (|𝐶𝑖| > 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶)
 
(11) 
 
Using this formula, normal clusters were defined by counting the number of 
records in each cluster, |Ci|, and determining if it was within K standard deviations of the 
mean number of events in each cluster. Anomalies were defined by evaluating if the 
count of records in each cluster was outside of the range of normal events. 
The cluster generation performed in this experiment began with the NSL-KDD 
dataset because of its smaller size and lower computational resource requirements. The 
output file from this experiment was imported into Microsoft Excel and was analyzed 
using pivot tables. This analysis isolated a sample partition, calculated the mean number 
of records per cluster, calculated the standard deviation of the number of records per 
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cluster, and calculated a variable number of standard deviations above and below the 
mean.  
This experiment found that the results of the clustering ensembles were not 
distributed as originally expected. Instead, clusters with the highest numbers of records 
predominantly had 100% normal classes. Clusters with the least number of records had a 
mixture of normal and anomalous classes, but none of these clusters could be identified 
as exclusively anomalous. Table 8 shows an example of what was found for a sample 
partition in one of the tests. In this test, the partition had 13 clusters, labeled from 0 to 12. 
Using the total record count for each cluster, two standard deviations above the mean was 
14,944. The only cluster that had more records than this threshold was cluster 6, which 
had 14,974 records. Cluster 6 consisted exclusively of normal records. It is also important 
to note that two standard deviations below the mean was -4,420, making it impossible for 
any clusters to have a number of records below this threshold.  
 
Table 8 
Distribution of Attack and Normal Records in Sample Partition 
Label Attack Normal Total 
6 0 14,974 14,974 
8 4 14,466 14,470 
2 0 8,704 8,704 
1 0 6,668 6,668 
4 582 5,234 5,816 
5 44 4,534 4,578 
3 79 3,555 3,634 
7 4 2,705 2,709 
9 0 2,337 2,337 
12 0 2,087 2,087 
0 311 821 1,132 
10 12 845 857 
11 29 413 442 
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After observing this distribution in the sample of partitions, this experiment 
implemented a Python function that generated the pivot tables for all partitions generated 
using the NSL-KDD dataset. The result was consistent across approximately 99% of the 
partitions. Exploring this observation further, the function was applied to the UNSW-
NB15 dataset and found that clusters with a number of records above the threshold were 
consistently normal classes with a high degree of accuracy. As a result, this experiment 
modified the original assumption by finding that: 
𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦 = {
0, |𝐶𝑖| ≥ 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶
< 0.5, |𝐶𝑖| < 𝜇𝐶 + 𝐾𝜎𝐶
 
(12) 
 
This updated function resulted in a high degree of certainty of what was normal 
when two standard deviations was selected for K. For clusters with less than this 
threshold number of events, there was uncertainty, which is reflected as a probability of 
0.5 or less that an event is anomalous. It was expected that a higher number of standard 
deviations above the mean would result in a more accurate prediction of normal events, 
but this resulted in less records that met the criteria and did not improve the accuracy. 
After evaluating the clustering results using ranges of K standard deviations from 1.5 to 
4, this experiment found that 2 standard deviations performed consistently well in 
identifying the normal classes. 
 
Computational Efficiency 
Cluster generation was the most computationally expensive algorithm of the 
experiments. Although this was not a significant problem for the NSL-KDD dataset, 
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because of the lower number of records, it was a problem for the UNSW-NB15 dataset. 
When this experiment used a maximum number of 20 clusters per partition, the cluster 
generation was relatively quick; however, to obtain a more diverse set of clusters, a 
maximum of 100 cluster centers per partition was selected. For the UNSW-NB15 dataset, 
to generate 100 partitions with up to 100 clusters per partition, the algorithm took 
approximately 12 hours to complete. 
The computational complexity for the scikit-learn implementation of k-means 
clustering is O(knT), where k is the number of clusters, n is the number of samples, and T 
is the number of iterations. This was prohibitive, since all 700,001 samples in the 
UNSW-NB15 dataset were used, and since the maximum number of clusters per partition 
was as high as 100. In addition, a maximum of 300 iterations was selected for the k-
means clustering algorithm, which was time consuming to run as many as 100 partitions 
per cluster generation run. 
The generation of partitions can be scaled by running the algorithm in parallel. 
This experiment overcame some of the computational complexity by submitting the input 
dataset to the same algorithm running on multiple servers. This allowed the generation of 
the multiple sets of partitions needed for this research to be created in the same time it 
took to create a single set of partitions.  
 
Observations 
This experiment created a diverse set of partitions using the k-means clustering 
algorithm to generate a range of clusters per partition from 40 to 100 for the NSL-KDD 
and UNSW-NB15 datasets. It also found that a random bagging plan that ranged from 
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25% to 75% of available features was effective in generating diverse partitions. Most 
importantly, this experiment found that the distribution of clustering results by counting 
the events in each cluster did not clearly identify anomalous events, but rather could be 
used accurately to identify certain normal records. The result of this experiment indicated 
that P(E) for each event was not a hard probability but rather was a soft belief that could 
be used as an observation for updating P(A|E). The observations from this experiment 
were carried forward into the second experiment to determine if the results could be used 
for anomaly detection. 
 
Experiment 2: Probabilistic Anomaly Detection 
This experiment consisted of two algorithms. Beginning with the partitions 
generated in the first experiment, this algorithm first calculated the probability that an 
event was an anomaly, P(E). As found in the first experiment, this turned out to be a 
belief that had more accuracy for normal events than for anomalies. The second 
algorithm used P(E) to predict the probability that a computer system was experiencing a 
cyberattack, P(A). 
 
Design of P(E) Calculation 
Using the proposed algorithm from the methodology section, it was expected that 
in this experiment, P(E) would be calculated as the average of the anomalous clusters: 
P(𝐸𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑦
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
(13) 
In the first experiment, this research found that it was more predictive to look at 
which clusters contained normal records rather than which clusters contained anomalies. 
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To evaluate this algorithm and update this formula, this experiment used Microsoft Excel 
pivot tables to find the number of partitions that classified each event as normal. Figure 9 
illustrates the distribution of the event-level classes according to the number of votes that 
a set of 100 partitions generated using the NSL-KDD dataset. In this graph, 100 
represents all the partitions voting that the event was normal and 0 represented no votes 
that the event was normal.  The normal and attack classes are shown on different axes 
and at different scales because of the imbalanced nature of the dataset. It is important to 
note in this graph that above the midpoint number of votes, which was 50, this approach 
demonstrated high accuracy for detecting normal events.  
 
  
Figure 9. Graph of votes for NSL-KDD dataset 
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A different pattern was found when evaluating the partitions generated using the 
UNSW-NB15 dataset with 100 partitions. Figure 10 shows the distribution of events 
compared to the number of votes. An interesting observation with this dataset was that 
there were no instances where all the partitions voted that an event was normal. The 
highest number of votes was 42. The pattern looked smoother, with less but more 
pronounced peaks. Despite the differences with the NSL-KDD dataset, it still held that 
above the midpoint number of votes, which was 21, this number of votes was still an 
accurate method for detecting normal events with a high degree of accuracy.  
 
 
Figure 10. Graph of votes for UNSW-NB15 dataset 
 
Since this evaluation found that P(E) was certain for highly normal clusters and 
uncertain for others, the calculation of P(E) was updated to assign a belief ranging from 
0, for normal clusters, to 0.5, for uncertain clusters. To calculate P(E), this experiment 
first evaluated Canomaly using two standard deviations as the threshold. Then using voting, 
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for each event, this experiment counted the number of partitions that indicated the event 
was normal. At this point, it was found that all events, with a few exceptions, were 
normal when the number of normal votes ranged from the maximum of votes to half of 
the maximum of votes. Thus, the algorithm was developed to assign P(E) = 0 for events 
in this upper half of the votes. Below this range, the algorithm scaled P(E) to range from 
0, for the most votes below the midpoint, to 0.5, for events with the least number of 
votes. 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
max(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠)
2
 (14) 
 
𝑃(𝐸) = {
0, 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝐸 ≥ 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
(1 −
𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝐸
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡)
2
, 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝐸 < 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
 (15) 
 
 
Analysis of P(E) Calculation 
The accuracy of P(E) was calculated for events that fell above the midpoint of the 
maximum votes, since below the midpoint P(E) was found to represent only a level of 
uncertainty. Below this threshold, events were assigned a belief, which was suggestive 
that there may have been anomalies, but did not reflect an accurate prediction of which 
events are anomalies. Thus, for events above the midpoint, there were no true positives 
and no false positives, since above this threshold, only true negative and false negative 
results were expected: 
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𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁
 
=
0 + 𝑇𝑁
0 + 0 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁
 
=
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁
 
(16) 
 
For the NSL-KDD dataset, the accuracy of P(E) above the midpoint was found to 
be: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁
 
=
27,394
27,394 + 3
 
= 0.999890 
(17) 
 
For the UNSW-NB15 dataset, the accuracy of P(E) above the midpoint was found 
to be: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁
 
=
129,508
2129,508 + 6
 
= 0.999954 
(18) 
 
Although P(E) was not highly predictive of anomalies, it was highly predictive of 
normal events. Thus, for determining that a computer system was under attack, P(A), this 
experiment proceeded to determine if the accumulation of uncertainty was predictive that 
a computer system was being attacked. 
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Design of P(A) Calculation 
After calculating P(E) for each event, this experiment then calculated P(A) as the 
probability that a computer system was being attacked. Through experimentation, it was 
found that calculating P(A) could be reduced to: 
P(𝐴) =
1
𝑁
∑ P(𝐸𝑁)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (19) 
 
In this formula, P(A) is the probability that a computer system is experiencing an 
attack, and N is the number of events attributable to each computer system. Thus, P(A) 
represents the mean of P(E) when grouped by the computer system. 
In calculating P(A) it was necessary to evaluate both computer systems involved 
in each event, the source IP address (srcip) and the destination IP address (dstip). Using 
the UNSW-NB15 dataset, it was not clear which of these two addresses represented the 
attacker or the target of the attack, so it was important to consider both addresses in 
calculating P(A).  
 
Analysis of P(A) Calculation 
Results varied when calculating P(A) for these two different IP addresses in each 
event. Experimentation found that to calculate P(A) for the srcip, it was more effective to 
group the events using a combination of srcip and dstip and to calculate the average P(E) 
for each pair. Further grouping the resulting dataset on just the srcip, the result was that 
for P(A) ≥ 0.8, the srcip addresses involved in attacks were consistently predicted with 
100% accuracy. For the dstip address, using just the average P(E) allowed the dstip 
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addresses to be identified for P(A) ≥ 0.8; however, there were some false positives of 
dstip addresses that were identified but were not involved in attacks. The inaccurate 
classifications were generally for destination IP addresses that had few events, which 
made them appear to be anomalies when compared to the entire dataset. Table 9 shows 
the results for a sample run including both the srcip and the dstip. The IP addresses that 
have P(A) ≥ 0.8 are shown in bold. The Result column indicates if the result was a true 
positive (TP), false positive (FP), or true negative (TN). There were no false negatives. 
 
Table 9 
Prediction of P(A) by srcip and dstip 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.920 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.997 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.907 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 0.996 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.842 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 0.993 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.622 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 0.992 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.621 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.988 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.619 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.987 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.609 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.977 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.608 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 0.963 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.608 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 0.920 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.604 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.903 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.601 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 0.887 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.600 
 
32.50.32.66 FP 0.861 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.597 
 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.784 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.465 
 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.656 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.462 
 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.616 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.459 
 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.607 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.459 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.599 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.440 
 
224.0.0.5 TN 0.597 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.420 
 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.596 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.412 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.591 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.409 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.589 
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Table 9 
Prediction of P(A) by srcip and dstip (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.389 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.587 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.376 
 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.583 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.231 
 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.582 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.174 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.564 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.169 
 
175.45.176.1 TN 0.525 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.160 
 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.513 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.158 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.509 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.110 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.449 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.090 
 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.343 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.086 
 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.339 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.078 
 
175.45.176.0 TN 0.312 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.078 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.305 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.066 
 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.301 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.061 
 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.294 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.056 
 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.293 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.053 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.273 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.026 
 
175.45.176.3 TN 0.262 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.022 
 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.231 
   
 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.228 
    
149.171.126.4 TN 0.225 
    
10.40.198.10 TN 0.137 
    
127.0.0.1 TN 0.000 
 
To ensure that the results were consistent, this experiment included ten runs of the 
algorithm, using a different set of randomly generated partitions for each run. Table 9 
shows the accuracy of calculating P(A) for the srcip and dstip. As Table 10 demonstrates, 
the results were reproduceable for each of the runs. Thus, the algorithm did not require a 
specific set of features or feature engineering to be successful, since the random partitions 
of clusters proved to be successful for all runs. 
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Table 10 
P(A) Accuracy for Ten Runs  
 
srcip 
 
dstip 
Run # TP TN FP FN Accur. 
 
TP TN FP FN Accur. 
1 4 41 0 0 1.00 
 
10 28 6 0 0.86 
2 4 41 0 0 1.00 
 
10 27 7 0 0.84 
3 4 41 0 0 1.00 
 
10 26 8 0 0.82 
4 4 41 0 0 1.00 
 
10 31 3 0 0.93 
5 4 41 0 0 1.00 
 
10 31 3 0 0.93 
6 4 41 0 0 1.00 
 
10 30 4 0 0.91 
7 4 41 0 0 1.00 
 
10 28 6 0 0.86 
8 4 41 0 0 1.00 
 
10 25 9 0 0.80 
9 4 41 0 0 1.00 
 
10 30 4 0 0.91 
10 4 41 0 0 1.00 
 
10 30 4 0 0.91 
 
 
Computational Efficiency 
It was expected that the computational complexity for this algorithm would be 
O(2n). By using pandas DataFrame objects extensively, this algorithm did not directly 
loop through each event. It did loop through each partition, which resulted in 100 
iterations. The algorithm relied upon the built-in optimizations of the DataFrame class to 
perform calculations for the entire dataset. As a result, it can be estimated that this 
algorithm’s complexity may be expressed as less than O(n). In testing, algorithms for 
calculating P(E) and P(A) completed in less than one minute. Thus, the use of the 
algorithm for anomaly detection did not add any significant computational penalty 
beyond the performance of multiple runs of the k-means clustering that were used in the 
first experiment to generate the partitions.   
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Observations 
The results of this experiment demonstrated that unsupervised anomaly detection 
at the event-level was not accurate for detecting attack classes. Instead, event-level 
detection using this approach found a portion of the normal classes with highly accurate 
results. Using this observation to calculate a belief that an event may be anomalous was 
found to be highly effective in calculating the probability that a computer system was 
under attack. By examining the srcip and dstip separately, the accuracy was consistently 
100% for the srcip and ranged from 80% to 93% for the dstip. As a result, this 
experiment demonstrated that the clustering ensemble probabilistic intrusion detection 
system detected the computer systems that were under attack. It accomplished this 
prediction without relying upon labeled data for training and without training during 
attack-free time periods to detect abnormal events.  
 
Experiment 3: Active Learning 
Design 
The third experiment incorporated active learning into the overall intrusion 
detection system. When initially proposing this research, it was unclear how active 
learning would be applied, since it depended on how the first two experiments were 
implemented. Since active learning queries an oracle to label of a select number of 
records, the primary design consideration was how large of a sample to submit to the 
oracle. Options considered were to sample from the events to update P(E) or to sample 
from the computer system level to update P(A). 
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Figure 11 lists the pseudocode for this algorithm. This algorithm selects all srcip 
and dstip computer systems that had P(A) ≥ 0.8. From this subset of all computer 
systems, a pseudorandom sample of events for each of these computer systems was 
selected. These sampled events were submitted to the oracle for labeling. If the oracle 
returned a response that the event was an attack, then the P(A) for that srcip or dstip was 
updated to 1.0, signifying that the computer system was experiencing an attack. 
  
For each srcip with P(A) ≥ 0.8: 
 Collect events with srcip 
 Create sample of N records from collected events 
 For each record in sample: 
  Ask oracle for labels 
  If number of attack labels > 0: 
   Update P(A) to 1 
  Else: 
   Update P(A) to 0 
For each dstip with P(A) ≥ 0.8: 
 Collect events with dstip 
 Create sample of N records from collected events 
 For each record in sample: 
  Ask oracle for labels 
  If number of attack labels > 0: 
   Update P(A) to 1 
  Else: 
   Update P(A) to 0 
Figure 11. Pseudocode for active learning algorithm 
 
Unlike McElwee (2017), in which a separate oracle class was constructed to 
simulate the human analyst, this experiment relied upon the DataFrame that was used as 
a data structure for holding both the original dataset and the results. Attack labels were 
identified by querying the label column of the DataFrame. As a result, the queries always 
resulted in accurate labels, even for rare events. 
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Analysis 
Since the goal of this research was to reduce the workload of human analysts, the 
purpose of this experiment was to find the minimum number of samples to submit to the 
oracle for labeling that would still result in a high accuracy. To be representative of the 
events assigned to each srcip and dstip, a sample size of √𝑁 was selected as the starting 
point, where N was the number of events for each srcip or dstip. Initial experimentation 
with this sample size concluded that active learning consistently identified computer 
systems under attack with 100% accuracy. Next, this experiment proceeded to reduce the 
number of samples and evaluate the accuracy, as shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 
Active Learning Accuracy  
 
srcip 
 
dstip 
 
Sample Accuracy 
 
Sample Accuracy 
√𝑁 317 100.0% 
 
499 100.0% 
√𝑁
3
 73 100.0% 
 
134 100.0% 
√𝑁
4
 35 100.0% 
 
70 100.0% 
√𝑁
5
 23 100.0% 
 
47 97.7% 
√𝑁
10
 10 100.0% 
 
22 95.4% 
 
 
The results in Table 10 show that for srcip, the accuracy is 100% for all sample 
sizes, but this is because the original accuracy of the anomaly detection in the second 
experiment was already 100%. Thus, the dstip is a better indicator of sample sizes for 
active learning. Each sample size improved the original accuracy of anomaly detection 
100 
for the dstip. Sample sizes of √𝑁
4
 and above achieved accuracies of 100%. To confirm 
this sample size was the minimum for achieving this accuracy, this sample size was run 
10 times and achieved the same results each time. 
Figure 12 shows the accuracy of the active learning compared to the sample size. 
For sample sizes smaller than √𝑁
4
, the accuracy shows a downward slope. 
 
  
Figure 12. Accuracy of active learning compared to sample size 
 
Computational Efficiency 
The algorithm for active learning with a simulated oracle was highly efficient, 
since it had access to P(E), P(A), and the original features, including the label. Thus, by 
creating the random sample using the DataFrame, the algorithm could stop as soon as a 
single attack was identified. For each run, the computation time for this algorithm was a 
few seconds. It was estimated that, where N is the total number of that could be sent to 
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the oracle for labeling, the complexity was 𝑂(2√𝑁
4
), since for each sampled record, the 
algorithm completed the same loop for both the srcip and the dstip. 
 
Observations 
This experiment demonstrated that by sampling events for srcip and dstip with a 
sample size of √𝑁
4
, the residual error from anomaly detection could be reduced to 
achieve 100% accuracy. This approach relies on the anomaly detection algorithm 
identifying all of the true positives, since this active learning approach focuses on 
eliminating false positives, not on reducing false negatives. As a result, when the active 
learning algorithm was applied to the UNSW-NB15 dataset with 700,001 events, a 
human analyst would have been required to review a maximum of 105 events to identify 
all of the computer systems involved in an attack with 100% accuracy. 
 
Summary 
This chapter described the design and implementation of the experiments 
performed in this research. It showed the class diagram of the major components of the 
system and reviewed the function of each. In addition, this chapter provided a more in-
depth description of the dataset characteristics and preprocessing needed to ensure that 
the datasets were highly imbalanced. 
This chapter also reviewed each experiment, including specific design 
considerations, analysis, and observations. Since computational efficiency has been an 
important consideration when implementing clustering ensemble evaluation, the 
computational efficiency was discussed for each experiment. Each of the experiments 
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contributed to the overall demonstration that clustering ensembles were effective for 
anomaly-based intrusion detection. The first experiment identified a characteristic of 
imbalanced datasets that allowed the isolation of a significant portion of normal events. 
Using this characteristic of imbalanced data, the second experiment assigned a belief to 
the events to reflect uncertainty. In addition, the second experiment estimated the 
probability that a computer system was experiencing an attack by calculating the 
probability as the average belief at the event level and by scaling the result to range from 
zero to one. The second experiment found that for source IP addresses involved in 
attacks, the algorithm was 100% accurate for probabilities ≥ 0.8. For destination IP 
addresses involved in attacks, the algorithm was between 80% and 93% accurate for 
probabilities ≥ 0.8. Finally, the third experiment used the results of the previous 
experiment to incorporate active learning, which allowed a maximum of 105 events to be 
labeled by the oracle, thus improving the accuracy to 100% for the destination IP address.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
Conclusions 
This research set out to address the problem that there was no approach to 
intrusion detection that reduced the workload of human analysts by providing a 
probabilistic prediction that a computer was experiencing a cyberattack. The goal for 
addressing this problem was to improve anomaly-based intrusion detection by adding 
meaning to alerts by using probabilistic clustering ensembles. By adding meaning to 
alerts, the desired outcome was to reduce the workload of security analysts. 
Through the implementation of three experiments and the analysis of their results, 
five primary conclusions emerge. The first conclusion was that, as proposed, clustering 
ensembles provided multiple perspectives on the event data. These different perspectives 
were important in this research, since each partition only identified a single cluster of 
normal events. In some cases, the partition did not identify any normal events, but 
together the partitions provided sufficient observations to determine which computer 
systems were being attacked.  
Second, for highly imbalanced datasets, which are characteristic for intrusion 
detection, clustering ensembles were effective in identifying certain normal events with a 
high degree of accuracy. This was likely because of the highly imbalanced nature of the 
input dataset. By identifying clusters that contained more than two standard deviations 
above the mean of events in each cluster, approximately 95% or more similar events from 
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the partition were represented in the cluster. Although normal events were scattered 
throughout the remaining clusters and mixed with attack events, the identification of a 
large population of normal events enabled them to be eliminated from the belief that they 
contained attacks.  
The third conclusion of this research was that unsupervised intrusion detection did 
not require an accurate probability that an event was an attack. Prediction of events in this 
research resulted in a range of uncertainty, represented by a probability of 0.5, to a level 
of accurate identification of some normal events. Using the event-level prediction as a 
belief and aggregating that belief to the computer system level enabled prediction of 
computer systems under attack with 80% to 93% accuracy.  
The fourth conclusion of this research was that active learning enabled a 
minimum level of interaction by human analysts while increasing accuracy to 100%.  The 
algorithms developed in this research detected the computer systems experiencing attacks 
in a dataset with 700,001 events by requesting information from the oracle for 105 
events. As a result, this form of anomaly detection combined with active learning may be 
effective for reducing the workload of human analysts in practice.  
The fifth conclusion of this research was that the use of clustering ensembles for 
probabilistic intrusion detection, when combined with active learning, provided a highly 
accurate method for identifying computer systems that were experiencing a cyberattack. 
This method used unsupervised machine learning to identify the computer systems with 
the highest probability of an attack. It then used a minimal number of interactions with 
the oracle to accurately identify the affected systems. 
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Implications 
This research contributed to intrusion detection in several ways. First, the 
application of clustering ensembles to intrusion detection is a relatively new area of 
study. This research provided a new approach for anomaly-based intrusion detection that 
relied on the highly imbalanced nature of the data used to detect intrusions.  
Next, this research found that combining uncertain event-level probabilities 
allowed the estimation of the probability that a computer system was under attack with 
reasonable accuracy. This was an important contribution to research, since it 
demonstrated that event-level detection does not need to be highly accurate to provide a 
higher level of meaning to alerts. This opens the possibility that combining alerts from 
existing intrusion detection methods may also be effective when aggregated at the 
computer system level. 
This research also contributed to intrusion detection by contributing research that 
supports the use of a new dataset for intrusion detection – the UNSW-NB15 dataset. 
Since its release in 2015, it has been used in a growing number of research studies. This 
research further strengthens the support of a more contemporary dataset for intrusion 
detection and helps to better position the UNSW-NB15 to replace the outdated KDD Cup 
1999 dataset.   
Lastly, this research contributed to existing research in active learning for 
intrusion detection. At present, there does not appear to be research that applies active 
learning to use events to detect the probability of a computer system level attack. This 
contribution makes it possible to further reduce the workload of human analysts in 
reviewing alerts. 
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Recommendations 
This research laid a foundation for additional intrusion detection research. Three 
specific areas for future research should be considered. First, improvements in cluster 
partition evaluation will help to better qualify which partitions should be included in the 
anomaly detection. A better understanding of which partitions contribute to a good 
solution may help to improve the accuracy of anomaly detection at the event level, which 
will contribute to an improved calculation of the probability that a computer system is 
experiencing an attack. Second, this research should be extended to combine events from 
multiple security monitoring systems, such as host-based audit logs, signature-based 
alerts, and network flow data. Observations of potential attacks from these systems can 
be grouped using the computer system identifiers, such as IP addresses. As a result, this 
may enable improved CSA because of additional perspectives. Third, the experiments in 
this research combined observations at the event-level and grouped the results on the 
source and destination IP addresses. This approach may also be useful for combining 
event-level observations at the user-level, where user login names are provided within the 
event data. Future research should apply probabilistic clustering ensembles to insider 
threat detection to identify organization insiders who may pose a threat to the security of 
systems and data. 
In addition, this research presents an approach that may be used to improve 
existing security monitoring practices in organizations. Security analysts generally 
respond to event-level security alerts. In many cases, these alerts provide insufficient 
information to determine the credibility, significance, and impact of the alert. Using the 
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results of this research, it is possible to provide a broader picture of CSA by focusing 
security analysts on the computer systems that are most likely being attacked. This 
change in focus will allow security analysts to more quickly determine a course of action 
without relying on their own observations to create a mental picture of what is occurring. 
In addition, the algorithms used in this research can be adapted to include additional 
datasets as well as to be verified in operational networks. Finally, this research should be 
applied to off-line analysis of network data to support the newly emerging practice of 
cyber threat hunting, in which security analysts examine various data sources to identify 
computer systems that may have become compromised but did not trigger alerts from 
regular monitoring systems (Sqrrl Data, 2018).  
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Summary 
Introduction 
This research focused on the problem that there was no approach to intrusion 
detection that reduced the workload of human analysts by providing a probabilistic 
prediction that a computer is experiencing a cyberattack. Intrusion detection is the 
practice of examining information from computers and networks so that cyberattacks can 
be identified (Debar et al., 1999). Effective intrusion detection is important for 
organizations, since earlier detection of cyberattacks helps to reduce the impact and 
recovery costs (Ponemon Institute, 2016). Yet many intrusions are missed because of the 
volume of alerts that analysts must review, resulting in fatigue and errors in judgement 
(Julisch, 2003; Sawyer et al., 2014). 
This research addressed several problems associated with intrusion detection. 
First, it addressed the high false-positive rates that accompany highly imbalanced data 
sets, where there are very few attacks scattered through large datasets of normal events. 
To address this problem, this research used observations of sparse attack events to predict 
the probability that a computer system was experiencing an attack. This was more 
accurate than predicting attacks at the event level. In addition, this research applied active 
learning, which allowed simulated human interaction to improve the overall accuracy. 
Second, this research addressed problems of overfitting and evasion. These are important 
problems, since machine learning algorithms that are overfitted are unable to find novel 
attacks and are not resilient to evasive adversarial tactics (Sommer & Paxson, 2010). 
Third, this research addressed the issue of using suitable datasets for evaluation of 
intrusion detection systems. The KDD Cup 1999 dataset has been the standard dataset for 
109 
evaluation since its inception, but it does not reflect current operating systems and does 
not contain identifiers of the source or destination computer systems involved in each 
event. This research addressed this problem by using the NSL-KDD dataset, to provide a 
connection to past research, as well as the UNSW-NB15 dataset, to provide a more 
contemporary view of network events. 
This research was built upon a foundation of past research in intrusion detection. 
It applied CSA to establish a basis for deriving higher levels of meaning from intrusion 
alerts. It reviewed past machine learning approaches to intrusion detection research, 
especially probabilistic methods, to uncover the challenges and gaps in current research. 
It assessed the features and capabilities of clustering ensembles, with a focus on cluster 
evaluation. Finally, this research reviewed available intrusion detection datasets that had 
been developed and used in past research studies. 
 
Methodology 
To address the problems associated with intrusion detection, this research 
implemented three experiments. The purpose of the experiments was to test the initial 
assumptions that clustering ensembles with probabilistic analysis and active learning may 
be effective for intrusion detection. The experiments were conducted using a prototype 
that was created using Python, pandas, and scikit-learn. 
The first experiment evaluated cluster generation strategies and examined how to 
create diverse clustering results that could be used in subsequent experiments. The cluster 
generation approach used bagging to select a pseudorandom number and set of features 
for each partition of clustering results. Clusters were generated using the k-means 
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clustering algorithm. The generated clusters were evaluated to test the initial assumptions 
about the characteristics of what represented normal and attack events. 
The second experiment implemented and tested an algorithm that used the 
partitions of clusters that were generated in the first experiment to predict the probability 
that an event was an anomaly. Next, the algorithm used the event-level probabilities to 
calculate the probability that a computer system was experiencing an attack. To test if 
this algorithm was effective, this experiment evaluated the accuracy of both the event-
level and the computer system-level probabilities. 
The third experiment added active learning, which allowed the simulation of 
human interaction, to fine tune the overall results. The active learning was implemented 
by selecting a random sampling of the event-level probabilities for the computer systems 
that had ≥ 0.8 probability of experiencing an attack. This experiment evaluated the 
minimum number of samples that could be used to achieve improvements in accuracy. 
 
Results 
The first experiment found that using bagging and k-means clustering to generate 
a range of partitions with 40 to 100 clusters in each partition provided diverse results. 
This experiment found that the clustering results did not successfully identify anomalous 
events, but instead had higher accuracy in predicting the most normal clusters. By 
evaluating the mean number of events in each cluster of each partition, this experiment 
found that clusters that contained a number of events greater than or equal to two 
standard deviations above the mean number of events were consistently normal records. 
None of the events below this threshold were identified exclusively as attack events.  
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Using the results of the first experiment, the second experiment calculated the 
probability of an event being an anomaly from a range of 0 to 0.5. Thus, the event-level 
probability was more of a measure of uncertainty or belief. Next, it calculated the 
probability that a computer system was under attack by finding the mean of the event-
level probabilities for each source and destination computer system. This experiment 
evaluated the event-level probabilities and determined that, above a midpoint threshold of 
votes from each partition, the prediction of normal events was highly accurate. Next, this 
experiment evaluated the accuracy of the probability that a computer system was 
experiencing an attack. This test was conducted 10 times, using a new bagging plan for 
each run. The accuracy of detection using the source IP address was 100% for all 10 runs. 
The accuracy of detection using the destination IP address ranged from 80% to 93%.  
The third experiment evaluated the effect of adding active learning by selecting 
event-level samples for each of the computer systems that had probabilities of ≥ 0.8. The 
sample sizes tested ranged from √𝑁 to √𝑁
10
. This experiment found that samples of √𝑁
4
 
consistently resulted in improved accuracy that a computer system was experiencing an 
attack. As a result, for the 700,001 events in the UNSW-NB15 dataset, sampling a total 
of 105 events resulted in 100% accuracy. 
These results demonstrated that the use of clustering ensembles for probabilistic 
intrusion detection, when combined with active learning, provided a highly accurate 
method for identifying computer systems that were experiencing a cyberattack. The use 
of clustering ensembles provided multiple perspectives on the event data and enabled the 
prediction of attacks at the computer system-level by relying on the high-confidence 
normal events, even though the event-level prediction of anomalies was inaccurate.  
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Contributions and Future Work 
This research contributed to the field of intrusion detection by applying clustering 
ensembles to unsupervised anomaly detection. It is expected that this approach can be 
generalized to apply to other types of anomaly detection that are characterized by highly 
imbalanced datasets. Additional research should evaluate this in other applications, 
especially insider threat detection and cyber threat hunting. 
Another important contribution of this research is that it demonstrated that 
combining uncertain event-level data to predict the probability that a computer system is 
experiencing an attack is highly accurate. This approach provided more meaning than 
individual events alone could provide and may be expanded in future research to combine 
alerts from a variety of intrusion detection systems as well as other security event 
monitoring systems. This will further reduce the workload of human analysts by creating 
a higher level of situational awareness. 
This research also contributed to intrusion detection by applying a relatively new 
dataset, UNSW-NB15. As a result, this research strengthened support for a more 
contemporary dataset for intrusion detection. Future research should evaluate the use of 
probabilistic clustering ensembles with active learning to new datasets, as they are 
developed. In addition, future research should apply this approach using operational 
network data from an actual organization to validate that it can extend from research into 
practice. 
Finally, this research added to previous studies related to reducing the human 
workload and resulting fatigue that are associated with security monitoring. It provided a 
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practical approach to apply unsupervised machine learning to prioritize the computer 
systems that are most suspicious, and it minimized the amount of human decision-making 
required. As a result, it may allow security analysts to more quickly determine a course of 
action when dealing with cyberattacks. 
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Appendix A 
Source Code Availability and Usage 
 
All the source code for the experiments in this research is available at the author’s 
GitHub repository. It is available for researchers to enhance and extend this research in 
intrusion detection systems. This appendix describes how to obtain the source code, the 
package dependencies, configuration parameters, and execution instructions. Many of 
these instructions are specific to the Ubuntu operating system and may need to be adapted 
for other systems. 
 
Source Code 
The source code may be downloaded from GitHub at: 
https://github.com/stevenmcelwee/cepids 
From the command line, the source code may be cloned by: 
git clone https://github.com/stevenmcelwee/cepids.git 
 
Package Dependencies 
Python 2.7 and PIP 
The software used in this research was designed to work with Python 2.7. PIP was 
used to install additional packages. Python and PIP can be installed using: 
sudo apt install python2.7 python-pip 
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scikit-learn 
scikit-learn is required for the KMeans class, which performs the clustering. It can 
be installed using: 
pip install scikit-learn 
 
pandas 
When installed as an operating system package, the pandas package satisfies 
several additional dependencies, such as numpy. This can be installed using: 
sudo apt install python-pandas 
 
Configuration Parameters   
The following parameters are configurable by updating variables at the beginning 
of the cepids.py file: 
 
dataset_file 
The filename of the input dataset. This must be either the absolute path to the file 
or relative to the directory from which the cepids.py package is executed. Example: 
'datasets/derived/kdd_u2r_r2l.csv'. 
 
dataset_class 
The class name of the input dataset. This must be either UNSW or NSLKDD.  
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num_partitions 
 The number of partitions that will be generated. This is used subsequently when 
evaluating the partitions as well. The recommended setting is: 100. 
 
min_feature_ratio 
The minimum number of features that will be used in the bagging plan for 
generating diverse clusters. The recommended setting is: 0.25. 
 
max_feature_ratio 
The maximum number of features that will be used in the bagging plan for 
generating diverse clusters. The recommended setting is: 0.75. 
 
min_clusters 
The minimum number of clusters that will be created in each partition. The 
recommended setting is: 40. 
 
max_clusters 
The maximum number of clusters that will be created in each partition. The 
recommended setting is: 100. 
 
input_partition_file 
Optional. The source file for a previously generated set of partitions. If a CSV 
was retained from Experiment 1, it can be used as the input for Experiment 2 to save time 
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and prevent recreation of partitions each time changes are made in the second 
experiment. If left blank, Experiment 1 will generate new partitions. If provided, it must 
contain either the absolute or relative path to the CSV partition file. Example: 
'experiment1_partitions_unsw_100p_01.csv'. 
 
num_stdev 
This is the number of standard deviations above the mean number of clusters that 
will be used as a threshold to determine the clusters that contain normal classes. The 
recommended setting is: 2. 
 
sample_size_exponent 
The exponent for creating the sample size for active learning. For example: √𝑁
4
=
𝑁
1
4. To set the exponent, this can be set as a decimal value, or for readability, as an 
equation, such as: 1.0/4. Note that in Python, the decimal value of 1.0 is needed to 
prevent Python from truncating this to an integer. The recommended value is: 1.0/4. 
 
active_learning_output_file 
The desired path to the results file to be created in Experiment 3. The output file 
is a CSV file that contains the srcip, dstip, P_E, P_A_SRC, P_A_DST, and label for each 
event in the original dataset. Example: 'results/final_output.csv'. 
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Appendix B 
Dataset Descriptions 
 
NSL-KDD 
The derived version of the NSL-KDD dataset retains the characteristics of the 
NSL-KDD dataset, but removes the denial of service events. It includes only user-to-root 
attacks, remote-to-local attacks, and normal records is available at: 
https://github.com/stevenmcelwee/cepids/raw/master/datasets/derived/kdd_u2r_r2
l.zip 
 
The data was created using a Python script that is available at: 
https://github.com/stevenmcelwee/cepids/blob/master/create_traces.py 
 
The NSL-KDD dataset is composed of 41 attributes, a label, and a cluster ID that 
was created specifically for the NSL-KDD dataset. The table below shows the specific 
field names that are included as well as the datatypes. 
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Table 11  
NSL-KDD Attributes and Datatypes 
Attribute Datatype Description 
duration continuous length (number of seconds) of the 
connection  
protocol_type symbolic type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, etc.  
service symbolic network service on the destination, e.g., 
http, telnet, etc.  
flag symbolic normal or error status of the connection  
src_bytes continuous number of data bytes from source to 
destination  
dst_bytes continuous number of data bytes from destination to 
source  
land continuous 1 if connection is from/to the same 
host/port; 0 otherwise  
wrong_fragment continuous number of ``wrong'' fragments  
urgent continuous number of urgent packets  
hot continuous number of “hot”' indicators 
num_failed_logins continuous number of failed login attempts  
logged_in continuous 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise  
num_compromised continuous number of “compromised” conditions  
root_shell continuous 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise  
su_attempted continuous 1 if “su root” command attempted; 0 
otherwise  
num_root continuous number of “root” accesses  
num_file_creations continuous number of file creation operations  
num_shells continuous number of shell prompts  
num_access_files continuous number of operations on access control 
files  
num_outbound_cmds continuous number of outbound commands in an ftp 
session 
is_host_login continuous 1 if the login belongs to the “hot” list; 0 
otherwise  
is_guest_login continuous 1 if the login is a “guest” login; 0 
otherwise  
count continuous number of connections to the same host as 
the current connection in the past two 
seconds  
srv_count continuous number of connections to the same service 
as the current connection in the past two 
seconds  
serror_rate continuous % of connections that have “SYN” errors  
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Table 11 
NSL-KDD Attributes and Datatypes (cont.) 
Attribute Datatype Description 
srv_serror_rate continuous % of connections that have “SYN” 
errors for same service connections 
rerror_rate continuous % of connections that have “REJ” errors  
srv_rerror_rate continuous % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors 
for same service connections 
same_srv_rate continuous % of connections to the same service  
diff_srv_rate continuous % of connections to different services  
srv_diff_host_rate continuous % of connections to different hosts  
dst_host_count continuous Number of connections having the same 
destination host IP address 
dst_host_srv_count continuous Number of connections having the same 
port number 
dst_host_same_srv_rate continuous The percentage of connections that were 
to the same service, among the 
connections aggregated in 
dst_host_count 
dst_host_diff_srv_rate continuous The percentage of connections that were 
to different services, among the 
connections aggregated in 
dst_host_count 
dst_host_same_src_port_rate continuous The percentage of connections that were 
to the same source port, among the 
connections aggregated in 
dst_host_srv_c ount 
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate continuous The percentage of connections that were 
to different destination machines, among 
the connections aggregated in 
dst_host_srv_c 
dst_host_serror_rate continuous The percentage of connections that have 
activated the flag (4) s0, s1, s2 or s3, 
among the connections aggregated in 
dst_host_count 
dst_host_srv_serror_rate continuous The percent of connections that have 
activated the flag (4) s0, s1, s2 or s3, 
among the connections aggregated in 
dst_host_srv_c ount 
dst_host_rerror_rate continuous The percentage of connections that have 
activated the flag (4) REJ, among the 
connections aggregated in 
dst_host_count 
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Table 11 
NSL-KDD Attributes and Datatypes (cont.) 
Attribute Datatype Description 
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate continuous The percentage of connections that have 
activated the flag (4) REJ, among the 
connections aggregated in 
dst_host_srv_c ount 
label symbolic Class of each event 
cluster_id symbolic Integer cluster id that is representative of 
the class 
 
UNSW-NB15 
For the UNSW-NB15 dataset, the file UNSW-NB15_1.csv was used for the 
experiments in this research. Table 12 shows the features, datatypes, and descriptions of 
this dataset. It is available from the original researchers at: 
https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/unsw-canberra-cyber/cybersecurity/ADFA-NB15-
Datasets/UNSW-NB15_1.csv 
 
Table 12 
UNSW-NB15 Attributes and Datatypes 
Name Datatype  Description 
srcip nominal Source IP address 
sport integer Source port number 
dstip nominal Destination IP address 
dsport integer Destination port number 
proto nominal Transaction protocol 
state nominal Indicates to the state and its dependent protocol, e.g. 
ACC, CLO, CON, ECO, ECR, FIN, INT, MAS, PAR, 
REQ, RST, TST, TXD, URH, URN, and (-) (if not used 
state) 
dur Float Record total duration 
sbytes Integer Source to destination transaction bytes  
dbytes Integer Destination to source transaction bytes 
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Table 12 
UNSW-NB15 Dataset (cont.) 
Name Datatype  Description 
sttl Integer Source to destination time to live value  
dttl Integer Destination to source time to live value 
sloss Integer Source packets retransmitted or dropped  
dloss Integer Destination packets retransmitted or dropped 
service nominal http, ftp, smtp, ssh, dns, ftp-data ,irc  and (-) if not 
much used service 
sload Float Source bits per second 
dload Float Destination bits per second 
spkts integer Source to destination packet count  
dpkts integer Destination to source packet count 
swin integer Source TCP window advertisement value 
dwin integer Destination TCP window advertisement value 
stcpb integer Source TCP base sequence number 
dtcpb integer Destination TCP base sequence number 
smeansz integer Mean of the ?ow packet size transmitted by the src  
dmeansz integer Mean of the ?ow packet size transmitted by the dst  
trans_depth integer Represents the pipelined depth into the connection of 
http request/response transaction 
res_bdy_len integer Actual uncompressed content size of the data 
transferred from the server’s http service. 
sjit Float Source jitter (mSec) 
djit Float Destination jitter (mSec) 
stime Timestamp record start time 
ltime Timestamp record last time 
sintpkt Float Source interpacket arrival time (mSec) 
dintpkt Float Destination interpacket arrival time (mSec) 
tcprtt Float TCP connection setup round-trip time, the sum of 
’synack’ and ’ackdat’. 
synack Float TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN 
and the SYN_ACK packets. 
ackdat Float TCP connection setup time, the time between the 
SYN_ACK and the ACK packets. 
is_sm_ips_ports Binary If source (1) and destination (3)IP addresses equal and 
port numbers (2)(4)  equal then, this variable takes 
value 1 else 0 
ct_state_ttl Integer No. for each state (6) according to specific range of 
values for source/destination time to live (10) (11). 
ct_flw_http_mthd Integer No. of flows that has methods such as Get and Post in 
http service. 
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Table 12 
UNSW-NB15 Dataset (cont.) 
Name Datatype  Description 
is_ftp_login Binary If the ftp session is accessed by user and password then 
1 else 0.  
ct_ftp_cmd integer No of flows that has a command in ftp session. 
ct_srv_src integer No. of connections that contain the same service (14) 
and source address (1) in 100 connections according to 
the last time (26). 
ct_srv_dst integer No. of connections that contain the same service (14) 
and destination address (3) in 100 connections 
according to the last time (26). 
ct_dst_ltm integer No. of connections of the same destination address (3) 
in 100 connections according to the last time (26). 
ct_src_ ltm integer No. of connections of the same source address (1) in 
100 connections according to the last time (26). 
ct_src_dport_ltm integer No of connections of the same source address (1) and 
the destination port (4) in 100 connections according to 
the last time (26). 
ct_dst_sport_ltm integer No of connections of the same destination address (3) 
and the source port (2) in 100 connections according to 
the last time (26). 
ct_dst_src_ltm integer No of connections of the same source (1) and the 
destination (3) address in in 100 connections according 
to the last time (26). 
attack_cat nominal The name of each attack category. In this data set , 
nine categories e.g. Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS 
Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode and 
Worms 
Label binary 0 for normal and 1 for attack records 
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Appendix C 
Python Package Versions 
 
This research used Python 2.7 as well as packages at specific versions. Although 
the cepids package may function with newer versions of these packages, it was only 
tested with the versions shown in Table 13 below: 
 
Table 13 
Python Package Versions 
Package Version 
dateutils 0.6.6 
numpy 1.13.3 
pandas 0.21.0 
pip 9.0.1 
python-dateutil 2.6.1 
scikit-learn 0.19.1 
scipy 1.0.0 
setuptools 28.8.0 
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Appendix D 
Detailed Anomaly Detection Results 
This appendix provides the detailed results of Experiment 2 for each of the 10 
experimental runs of the completed algorithm. Each run lists both the srcip and the dstip 
and their associated probabilities of experiencing an attack, P(A). IP addresses with P(A) 
≥ 0.8 are considered positive results. A results column indicates if the results are true 
positives (TP), true negatives (TN), or false positives (FP). There were no False negatives 
found in these experiments. 
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Table 14 
Experiment 2, Run 1 Results 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.918 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.980 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.876 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 0.962 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.824 
 
224.0.0.5 FP 0.956 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.659 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 0.918 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.652 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 0.912 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.649 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.907 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.630 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 0.904 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.624 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 0.898 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.622 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 0.896 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.622 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.894 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.621 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.870 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.620 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.869 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.615 
 
10.40.182.3 FP 0.842 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.543 
 
32.50.32.66 FP 0.841 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.538 
 
175.45.176.1 FP 0.827 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.527 
 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.772 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.520 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.738 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.513 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.677 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.513 
 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.671 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.511 
 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.645 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.508 
 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.643 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.507 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.642 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.495 
 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.640 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.296 
 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.638 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.213 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.633 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.175 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.632 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.172 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.626 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.169 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.622 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.113 
 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.547 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.103 
 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.527 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.101 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.522 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.082 
 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.508 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.082 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.492 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.074 
 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.492 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.070 
 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.480 
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Table 14 
Experiment 2, Run 1 Results (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.069 
 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.475 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.056 
 
175.45.176.3 TN 0.465 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.043 
 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.461 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.039 
 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.455 
    
149.171.126.5 TN 0.448 
    
175.45.176.0 TN 0.435 
    
127.0.0.1 TN 0.372 
    
10.40.198.10 TN 0.000 
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Table 15 
Experiment 2, Run 2 Results 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.915 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 0.992 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.891 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 0.965 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.807 
 
10.40.182.3 FP 0.953 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.771 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.948 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.770 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 0.920 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.769 
 
32.50.32.66 FP 0.910 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.761 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.908 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.756 
 
10.40.85.30 FP 0.893 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.752 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.875 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.752 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 0.872 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.748 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 0.869 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.747 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 0.868 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.741 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.864 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.473 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.844 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.470 
 
59.166.0.9 FP 0.815 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.460 
 
224.0.0.5 FP 0.813 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.459 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.789 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.451 
 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.780 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.448 
 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.778 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.441 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.771 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.438 
 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.768 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.419 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.766 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.418 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.759 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.267 
 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.758 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.174 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.747 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.164 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.619 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.162 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.572 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.124 
 
175.45.176.1 TN 0.538 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.099 
 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.520 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.078 
 
175.45.176.3 TN 0.466 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.067 
 
175.45.176.0 TN 0.361 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.046 
 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.292 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.046 
 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.288 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.039 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.277 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.026 
 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.261 
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Table 15 
Experiment 2, Run 2 Results (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.021 
 
10.40.198.10 TN 0.234 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.020 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.193 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.010 
 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.187 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.000 
 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.180 
    
149.171.126.8 TN 0.150 
    
127.0.0.1 TN 0.138 
    
149.171.126.6 TN 0.123 
    
149.171.126.7 TN 0.000 
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Table 16 
Experiment 2, Run 3 Results 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.919 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 1.000 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.878 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.997 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.838 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 0.994 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.761 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 0.981 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.753 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.981 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.745 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 0.981 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.727 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 0.972 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.724 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.971 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.724 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.967 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.723 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.956 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.723 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 0.945 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.720 
 
10.40.182.3 FP 0.943 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.716 
 
32.50.32.66 FP 0.898 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.515 
 
10.40.85.30 FP 0.893 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.494 
 
10.40.85.1 FP 0.814 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.489 
 
59.166.0.9 FP 0.813 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.488 
 
59.166.0.3 FP 0.804 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.484 
 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.799 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.472 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.798 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.470 
 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.797 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.467 
 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.792 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.442 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.782 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.430 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.770 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.279 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.767 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.180 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.759 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.180 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.660 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.177 
 
224.0.0.5 TN 0.653 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.168 
 
175.45.176.1 TN 0.493 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.118 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.441 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.105 
 
175.45.176.3 TN 0.430 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.092 
 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.365 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.088 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.355 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.083 
 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.349 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.083 
 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.323 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.075 
 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.320 
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Table 16 
Experiment 2, Run 3 Results (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.066 
 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.319 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.055 
 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.310 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.048 
 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.293 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.048 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.282 
    
149.171.126.7 TN 0.261 
    
149.171.126.5 TN 0.225 
    
10.40.198.10 TN 0.076 
    
175.45.176.0 TN 0.000 
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Table 17 
Experiment 2, Run 4 Results 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.920 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.997 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.907 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 0.996 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.842 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 0.993 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.622 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 0.992 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.621 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.988 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.619 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.987 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.609 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.977 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.608 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 0.963 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.608 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 0.920 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.604 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.903 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.601 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 0.887 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.600 
 
32.50.32.66 FP 0.861 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.597 
 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.784 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.465 
 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.656 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.462 
 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.616 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.459 
 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.607 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.459 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.599 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.440 
 
224.0.0.5 TN 0.597 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.420 
 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.596 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.412 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.591 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.409 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.589 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.389 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.587 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.376 
 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.583 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.231 
 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.582 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.174 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.564 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.169 
 
175.45.176.1 TN 0.525 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.160 
 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.513 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.158 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.509 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.110 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.449 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.090 
 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.343 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.086 
 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.339 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.078 
 
175.45.176.0 TN 0.312 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.078 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.305 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.066 
 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.301 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.061 
 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.294 
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Table 17 
Experiment 2, Run 4 Results (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.056 
 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.293 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.053 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.273 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.026 
 
175.45.176.3 TN 0.262 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.022 
 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.231 
    
149.171.126.2 TN 0.228 
    
149.171.126.4 TN 0.225 
    
10.40.198.10 TN 0.137 
    
127.0.0.1 TN 0.000 
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Table 18 
Experiment 2, Run 5 Results 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.939 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 0.998 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.920 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.987 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.858 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 0.986 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.726 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 0.978 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.713 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.972 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.706 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 0.963 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.695 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.945 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.693 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.901 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.691 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.876 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.688 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 0.866 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.687 
 
32.50.32.66 FP 0.814 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.684 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 0.807 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.683 
 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.745 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.520 
 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.717 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.513 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.717 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.513 
 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.716 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.499 
 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.715 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.495 
 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.715 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.486 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.706 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.483 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.693 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.474 
 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.686 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.471 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.683 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.391 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.683 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.205 
 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.534 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.173 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.524 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.168 
 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.445 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.164 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.414 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.139 
 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.412 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.111 
 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.397 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.090 
 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.395 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.087 
 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.373 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.075 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.362 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.075 
 
175.45.176.3 TN 0.362 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.070 
 
224.0.0.5 TN 0.360 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.057 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.341 
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Table 18 
Experiment 2, Run 5 Results (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.054 
 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.327 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.048 
 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.323 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.038 
 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.320 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.027 
 
175.45.176.1 TN 0.300 
    
149.171.126.5 TN 0.236 
    
175.45.176.0 TN 0.132 
    
10.40.198.10 TN 0.060 
    
127.0.0.1 TN 0.000 
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Table 19 
Experiment 2, Run 6 Results 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.926 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.978 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.906 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 0.975 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.836 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.975 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.737 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 0.974 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.722 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 0.966 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.721 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 0.965 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.718 
 
32.50.32.66 FP 0.959 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.716 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 0.952 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.713 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 0.943 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.710 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.936 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.708 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.894 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.706 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.876 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.700 
 
10.40.182.3 FP 0.819 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.541 
 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.713 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.525 
 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.696 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.519 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.690 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.515 
 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.678 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.506 
 
224.0.0.5 TN 0.675 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.499 
 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.671 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.498 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.671 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.498 
 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.670 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.483 
 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.659 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.468 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.656 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.268 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.646 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.188 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.645 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.185 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.629 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.185 
 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.570 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.163 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.484 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.115 
 
175.45.176.1 TN 0.423 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.113 
 
175.45.176.3 TN 0.304 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.096 
 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.294 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.083 
 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.252 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.083 
 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.221 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.076 
 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.205 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.072 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.201 
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Table 19 
Experiment 2, Run 6 Results (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.067 
 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.156 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.066 
 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.153 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.056 
 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.147 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.052 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.143 
    
149.171.126.5 TN 0.137 
    
149.171.126.1 TN 0.087 
    
10.40.198.10 TN 0.057 
    
175.45.176.0 TN 0.000 
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Table 20 
Experiment 2, Run 7 Results 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.925 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.975 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.866 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 0.964 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.824 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 0.956 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.669 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 0.949 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.668 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 0.945 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.665 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 0.937 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.662 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.934 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.656 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 0.926 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.652 
 
10.40.182.3 FP 0.897 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.652 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.889 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.646 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.885 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.646 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.865 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.632 
 
224.0.0.5 FP 0.824 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.524 
 
10.40.85.1 FP 0.822 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.507 
 
10.40.85.30 FP 0.812 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.507 
 
32.50.32.66 TN 0.750 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.502 
 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.706 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.481 
 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.690 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.477 
 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.682 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.470 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.678 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.464 
 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.672 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.460 
 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.668 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.422 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.660 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.264 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.660 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.187 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.652 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.178 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.635 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.171 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.617 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.148 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.598 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.102 
 
175.45.176.1 TN 0.557 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.092 
 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.499 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.086 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.459 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.086 
 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.453 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.086 
 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.445 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.076 
 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.429 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.076 
 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.410 
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Table 20 
Experiment 2, Run 7 Results (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.062 
 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.400 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.058 
 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.399 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.036 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.390 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.031 
 
175.45.176.3 TN 0.387 
    
149.171.126.1 TN 0.332 
    
175.45.176.0 TN 0.257 
    
127.0.0.1 TN 0.169 
    
10.40.198.10 TN 0.000 
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Table 21 
Experiment 2, Run 8 Results 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.913 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 0.963 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.877 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.941 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.833 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.938 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.761 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 0.937 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.736 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.933 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.730 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 0.932 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.714 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 0.931 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.711 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 0.929 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.711 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 0.901 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.710 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.898 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.706 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.893 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.706 
 
32.50.32.66 FP 0.883 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.702 
 
10.40.182.3 FP 0.835 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.578 
 
59.166.0.9 FP 0.827 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.573 
 
59.166.0.3 FP 0.810 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.557 
 
59.166.0.8 FP 0.804 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.548 
 
59.166.0.6 FP 0.804 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.540 
 
59.166.0.4 FP 0.803 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.537 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.799 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.531 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.788 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.528 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.786 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.527 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.784 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.514 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.776 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.190 
 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.645 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.186 
 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.644 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.181 
 
175.45.176.1 TN 0.634 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.146 
 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.630 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.108 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.621 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.102 
 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.612 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.095 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.610 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.089 
 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.608 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.089 
 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.593 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.081 
 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.580 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.081 
 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.575 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.059 
 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.572 
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Table 21 
Experiment 2, Run 8 Results (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.043 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.553 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.041 
 
224.0.0.5 TN 0.550 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.041 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.471 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.023 
 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.447 
    
175.45.176.3 TN 0.446 
    
127.0.0.1 TN 0.446 
    
175.45.176.0 TN 0.443 
    
10.40.198.10 TN 0.000 
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Table 22 
Experiment 2, Run 9 Results 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.929 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.998 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.908 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.997 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.847 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 0.996 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.659 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 0.985 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.650 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 0.981 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.649 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.980 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.644 
 
32.50.32.66 FP 0.962 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.644 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 0.929 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.642 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 0.927 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.638 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 0.912 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.636 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.907 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.631 
 
10.40.182.3 FP 0.824 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.631 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.819 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.433 
 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.707 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.421 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.656 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.409 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.600 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.386 
 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.598 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.386 
 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.595 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.385 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.594 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.379 
 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.588 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.371 
 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.583 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.361 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.576 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.320 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.572 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.262 
 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.571 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.189 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.555 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.186 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.551 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.174 
 
175.45.176.1 TN 0.495 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.171 
 
175.45.176.3 TN 0.485 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.125 
 
224.0.0.5 TN 0.467 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.117 
 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.378 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.109 
 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.197 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.086 
 
10.40.198.10 TN 0.182 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.081 
 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.135 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.081 
 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.106 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.072 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.088 
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Table 22 
Experiment 2, Run 9 Results (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.065 
 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.083 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.054 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.074 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.045 
 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.074 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.041 
 
175.45.176.0 TN 0.069 
    
149.171.126.2 TN 0.048 
    
149.171.126.3 TN 0.021 
    
149.171.126.8 TN 0.021 
    
149.171.126.6 TN 0.000 
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Table 23 
Experiment 2, Run 10 Results 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
175.45.176.1 TP 1.000 
 
10.40.170.2 FP 1.000 
175.45.176.3 TP 0.914 
 
149.171.126.12 TP 0.983 
175.45.176.2 TP 0.887 
 
149.171.126.14 TP 0.969 
175.45.176.0 TP 0.839 
 
149.171.126.13 TP 0.962 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.703 
 
149.171.126.15 TP 0.961 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.695 
 
149.171.126.17 TP 0.960 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.694 
 
149.171.126.19 TP 0.958 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.688 
 
149.171.126.11 TP 0.955 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.687 
 
149.171.126.18 TP 0.951 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.684 
 
224.0.0.1 FP 0.933 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.684 
 
149.171.126.16 TP 0.930 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.682 
 
149.171.126.10 TP 0.930 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.681 
 
10.40.182.3 FP 0.863 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.671 
 
32.50.32.66 FP 0.857 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.593 
 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.696 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.582 
 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.638 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.581 
 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.633 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.577 
 
59.166.0.2 TN 0.633 
59.166.0.9 TN 0.569 
 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.631 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.568 
 
59.166.0.8 TN 0.624 
59.166.0.3 TN 0.566 
 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.620 
59.166.0.6 TN 0.559 
 
59.166.0.4 TN 0.620 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.556 
 
175.45.176.0 TN 0.617 
59.166.0.0 TN 0.498 
 
175.45.176.2 TN 0.614 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.282 
 
59.166.0.1 TN 0.612 
149.171.126.18 TN 0.195 
 
59.166.0.5 TN 0.599 
149.171.126.15 TN 0.183 
 
59.166.0.7 TN 0.593 
10.40.182.1 TN 0.178 
 
224.0.0.5 TN 0.522 
149.171.126.10 TN 0.162 
 
10.40.85.1 TN 0.514 
149.171.126.19 TN 0.107 
 
149.171.126.0 TN 0.389 
149.171.126.16 TN 0.104 
 
149.171.126.2 TN 0.387 
149.171.126.11 TN 0.096 
 
149.171.126.5 TN 0.367 
10.40.170.2 TN 0.085 
 
149.171.126.3 TN 0.366 
10.40.182.3 TN 0.085 
 
149.171.126.9 TN 0.352 
149.171.126.13 TN 0.077 
 
149.171.126.1 TN 0.344 
149.171.126.12 TN 0.071 
 
149.171.126.4 TN 0.329 
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Table 23 
Experiment 2, Run 10 Results (cont.) 
srcip Result P(A) 
 
dstip Result P(A) 
10.40.85.30 TN 0.064 
 
149.171.126.6 TN 0.303 
127.0.0.1 TN 0.051 
 
149.171.126.8 TN 0.300 
149.171.126.17 TN 0.051 
 
149.171.126.7 TN 0.299 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.051 
 
192.168.241.243 TN 0.226 
    
127.0.0.1 TN 0.226 
    
175.45.176.3 TN 0.207 
    
175.45.176.1 TN 0.127 
    
10.40.198.10 TN 0.000 
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